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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the Third District Court's sua sponte dismissal of Appellant
Bryce Kraus' Petition for Finding of Paternity and Custody. Being a family law/custody
issue, this Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(I), Utah Code
(1994). Also, this case was tiansfened from the Utah Supreme Court, giving this Court
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(k), Utah Code (1994).2

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Did the trial judge err in dismissing the case for lack of standing?
Legal issue - coiTection of error standard. Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857
P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 1993) (where trial judge summarily dismissed case, this Court
applies Correction of Error standard). Accord, Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917,
919 (Utah 1993). Where correction of error standard applies, Court gives no particular
deference to trial court's reasoning. State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 654 (Utah 1995).
B. Was it error to refuse to require a blood test to determine paternity for
the minor child?
Legal issue - coiTection of error standard. Id. This involves interpretation of paternity
and presumed legitimacy statutes. Sec. 78-30-4 & 78-30-12. This is a question of law, so
the coiTection of error standard is applied, with no particular deference to the trial court's
construction. T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Utah App. 1988).
C. Is a divorce between Paul and September awarding custody to
September binding on Bryce, precluding him from asserting his rights to his natural son?

2

See also, Rules 3, 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Appellant's Brief, Kraus v. Plattsmeir, IX

Legal issue - correction of error standard. Id.
D. Assuming (a) Biyce is Dreu's father, and (b) he raised him for more than
half his life, and (c) September was married to Paul but living with Biyce when Dreu was
conceived, and (d) September divorced Paul with a decree giving her custody and Paul
visitation and a support obligation, then remarried Paul, then is Bryce entitled to court
access to establish his paternity, and enjoy custody or visitation?
Legal issue - correction of error standard. Id. Where there is a dismissal on purely
legal grounds, a correction of error standard is applied, affording the trial court no particular
deference. Skokos v. Corradinni, 260 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,12 (Utah 1995).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
All these authorities are included in Appendix A, and are not set forth verbatim here.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of Case.
This is an appeal from a final Order issued by the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, on
May 16, 1995, which Order* summarily (and sua sponte) dismissed this case for lack of
standing. That Order was an overruling of an objection to the recommendation issued from
the bench by Commissioner Michael Evans on February 9, 1995. Commissioner Evans'

3

R. 114-115.

Appellant's Brief, Kraus v. Plaitsmeir, X

recommendation was for dismissal, but on the basis that a prior divorce Decree was res
judicata as to Appellant Bryce Kraus (''Bryce"), preventing him from seeking custody.
Bryce objected on about February 15, 1995.4

B. Course of Proceedings*
1. The case is a Petition for Paternity, for Custody and to Amend Birth Certificate.
The Petition was filed December 8, 1994.5 The Petition was served with an Affidavit of
Petitioner Kraus in Support of Order to Show Cause0 and an Order to Show Cause.1
2. On February 6, 1995 Biyce filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Petitioner Kraus
in Support of Order to Show Cause}
3. Plattsmiers ("Paul and September"), the appellees, filed no response, answer,
opposition, denial or other paper in response to any of the above.

4

R. 56, February 16, 1995.

5

R. 2-6. The Petition seeks a finding that Appellant Biyce Kraus is the natural father of Dreu Prescott Kraus
Plattsmier, a three year old boy, R. 5, together with a grant of custody or visitation, with a request to amend the birth
certificate accordingly. R. 5-6.
R. 7-10. The Affidavit was accompanied by a Motion for Temporary Custody, Injunctive Relief and Order
to Show Cause. R. 11-12. These documents (and a summons) were personally served at the Chubbuck, Idaho home of
Appellee September Plattsmier on December 14, 1994. R. 13-14.
7

R. 15.

8

R. 23-54. This Memorandum incorporated a letter agreement between the parties piouding for Christmas,
1994 visitation with Biyce, R. 29, and a transcript of a Three Month Protective Order action, at which September
Plattsmier testified on December 23, 1994 R 30-54.
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4. The Show Cause Hearing was before Commissioner Evans on February 9, 1995.9
September and Paul appeared personally, without counsel.
5. Without any oral or written argument or motion challenging temporary relief,
Commissioner Evans denied the motion sua sponte.

He stated simply that because

September and Paul had divorced (for a short time), the Decree awarding custody of
Bryce and September's son10 to her was res judicata and binding on Bryce.11
6. There is no specific minute entiy page in the record indicating the hearing was
held. However, the docket entiy12 shows the following entiy with abbreviations in original
on the date scheduled for the Show Cause hearing:
OSC SCHEDULED FOR 2/9/95 COMM. MSE IS STRICKEN & EVEN
THOU (sic) COUNSEL FOR DEFT IS NO PRESENT, PLTF'S MOTION IS
DENIED.
R. 112. The seemingly haphazard docket entiy does not note the appearances by all of the
parties, or by the undersigned counsel for Biyce. Id.

September was ordered to appear and show cause why Biyce should not be awarded temporary custody of
Dreu, an award of visitation and child support, enjoining September from removing Dreu from Utah and Idaho, or
denying Bryce access to Dreu, and requiring that if she challenges paternity, a DNA paternity test be performed by the
University of Utah Eccles Genetics Lab.
10

See, Plattsmierv. Plattsmier, Third District Court, Judge Murphy, Case # 94-490406 DA.

For some unknown reason, there is no minute entiy in the record memorializing Commissioner Evans'
recommendation or that the hearing was even held.
12

R. 112.
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siiasponte recommendation18, and ordered the entire action dismissed, but based on different
grounds: she ruled that Biyce lacks standing to assert any rights in the minor child, since
Paul and September were married when Dreu was conceived and bom.
12. The Order of Dismissal for Lack of Standing was entered May 16, 1995, and that
is the order from which this appeal is taken.19
13. Both Commissioner Evans and Judge Peuler had suggested that to avoid res
judicata effect of the divorce case, Biyce ought to intervene in that case. Without admitting
that it is necessaiy, Biyce filed a Motion to Intervene in that case, Plattsmier v. Plattsmier,
No. 944900406DA. That motion is still pending in that court, Judge Muiphy presiding.20

C. Disposition at trial court level.
1. Date of Judgment or Order Appealed from. Judgment, in the form of a final Order
of Dismissal, was entered by the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler in this matter on May 16, 1995,

15

Minute Entry at R. 111-112.

R. 114-115. The Order as proposed was altered by Judge Peuler prior to signature. As submitted it read in
part that the matter was "dismissed on the basis that petitioner lacks standing to assert paternity, since respondents were
married (albeit separated) when Dreu Kraus Plattsmier was bom. The Commissioner's recommendation is affirmed."
The foregoing shows by shading the portion stricken out by the Judge when she entered the Order. R. 115. The lower
court gave no notice to the undersigned or the parties of the change, and it came to the attention of the undersigned only
during preparation of this Appeal Brief.
20

The Motion to Intervene, to Modify, Alter or Amend Divorce Decree was to be heard on August 28th, but
has been continued to October 3, 1995, due to the parties having stipulated to have blood usting accomplished, and to
permit better notice. Interestingly, the Commissioner in that case is also Commissionei \l\ :,ns He suggested (without
ruling) that intervention may not be necessaiy, since the Decree would no longer be effective. Miice Paul and September
remarried shortly after the divorce. This is in contrast to his refusal to recognize that fact in tLs case, where he ruled
that Bryce is bound by that earlier decree, even though he was told clearly that the Piattsmicrs iud reman ied.
Aiwetlant's Brief, Kraus v. Plattsmeir, XIV

7. Objection. An objection was timely filed13, and was fully briefed by Bryce1.4
8. While that objection was pending, Bryce filed an Acknowledgment of Paternity
with the Utah Department of Health.15
9. On February 13, 1995, there having been no response or opposition, Biyce filed
a Notice to Submit for Decision, attempting to avoid the need for a hearing. The Notice to
Submit was not honored, but rather a hearing was set.
10. Still neither Paul nor September ever filed a written Answer or any other paper
in this case, though they were served with the Petition, Order to Show Cause, Summons and
related documents on December 14, 1994. They are therefore in default. They did appear
personally at the Show Cause hearing before Commissioner Evans, but have filed nothing
in writing. However the clerk of the lower court refused on April 6, 1995 to enter a Default
Certificate submitted on behalf of Bryce.16
11. On March 24, 199517 Judge Peuler entertained oral argument on the objection.
Paul and September Plattsmier did not appeal'. Judge Peuler affirmed Commissioner Evans'

13

R. 56-57.
R. 58-67; amended and corrected at R. 71-83, with attachments covering R. 84-109.

15

R. 7-8.

R. 112. The reasons given were the commissioner's finding of no jurisdiction, affirmed by Judge Peuler,
and claimed defects in service of process. None of those defects was raised by any party; only by the lower court clerk.
17

Notice of Hearing, March 8, 1995. R. 68. See also, R. 110.
Appellant's Brief, Kraus v Ptattsmeir, XIII

which Order summarily dismissed this case for lack of standing,21 coupled with an argument
by Judge Peuler that strong public policy dictates against Biyce, whom she characterized as
a legal "stranger", from invading the "intact family" of Paul and September.22 There were
no post-judgment motions.
2. Refusal to Enter Default. Despite failure to answer, the trial court refused a
request that it enter the respondents' default. See paragraph 10 in section B above.
3. Date of Filing Appeal. The appeal was filed in the trial court on June 15, 1995,
stating that was an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.23 Nevertheless, the appeal was
apparently sent by the trial court to the Utah Supreme Court, arriving June 20, 1995.24
4. Transfer from Supreme Court. On July 12, 1995 this case was transferred by the
Supreme Court to this Court for disposition.

D. Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues on Appeal.
1. This is a custody case with aspects of a reverse paternity controversy, relating to
Dreu Prescott Kraus Plattsmier, bom June 15, 1992 in San Diego, California.25

See, Order of Dismissal for Lack of Standing, R. 114-115 as altered. See footnote 8, above.
R. 7,8, 10, 11.
R. 116-117.
R. 118, letter from Supreme Court Clerk.
R. 59.
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2.

Respondent September (''September") Plattsmier is Dieifs natural mother.

Respondent Paul Plattsmier ("Paul") has been a step father to Dieu, and currently claim to
be his natural father.26
3. Appellant Bryce is the natural father of Dreu, and Bryce's last name (Kraus)
is Dreu's middle name.27 Respondents Paul and September now deny Bryce's paternity, but
September has repeatedly admitted28 that Biyce is Dreu's biological father, which admissions
can be solidly proved if Biyce gets the opportunity to have his claims fairly aired. And the
issue could have been determined by the trial court ordering paternity testing.29
4. While that objection was pending, Biyce filed an Acknowledgment of Paternity
with the Utah Department of Health.10
5. September and Paul were formerly married, divorced in September, 199431, and
very shortly thereafter remarried. The 1994 divorce may have been a collusive effort to

26

R 59-60

27

R 72

28

September admits paternity lepeatedly in videos made in the hospital light alter Dieu s birth, and in videos
made later, all of which aie available as evidence R 59 She even gave Dieu Biyce s surname She states in a recent
letter in her own handwriting "You do have t»o Dads. Your D;ukh Paul, and \our father, Brjce. Bryce is jour
biological father and Paul is yom legal fathei who wanted to (and did) sign \oui birth certificate
But now, I have to
decide where you would be most happy - - w ith us, 01 with Daddv Brvce It's impossible to see into the iiiture Your
Daddy Bryce is all alone without you I've decided to try letting >ou he with him. He is a good man and father...
." June 15, 1994 birthday lettei trom Septembei to Dieu R 69
29

R 124

30

R 7-8

The di voice Court purported in that case to giant Septembei custodv of Dieu, lequning Paul to pay child
support to September, as though Dieu Paul's natuial child
Appellant's Brief, Kraus v. Plattsmeir, XVI

foreclose Bryce's parental rights. Biyce was not a party to that divorce case, # 944900406.32
The Findings contained false statements.

It is this separate divorce, which granted

September custody and Paul visitation, that Commissioner Evans (supported by Judge
Peuler) claimed was binding on Biyce.
6. Biyce is also step-father to September's other children, Summer and Drai, who
know him as "Daddy Biyce" or "Dad".33 Biyce, September, their son Dreu and September's
other children were living together in Biyce's Salt Lake home when Dreu was conceived.34
7. Bryce has been Dreu's primary caretaker.35 During most of Dreu's 2 lA year
life, Dreu resided with Bryce in Salt Lake County36, until September spirited him away.37
8. Most recently, from June, 1994 until November 24, 1994, Dreu lived alone with
Bryce in Salt Lake County. Neither September nor Paul lived with them at that time.
9. On Thanksgiving, 1994, September used a ruse about her having a visit with the
child, and took Dreu from Biyce, who was residing alone with him. Id. Until she took him

51

R. 59-60.

33

R. 93.

34

R.95.

35

R. 125.

36

While there is some dispute about the number of months the children were with the respective parties,
September admits that they lived substantial time with Biyce. See. e.g. Tr. 9 She admits that until Thanksgiving, Dreu
has never resided in Idaho. Tr. 11, L. 11 -22.
37

R. 40-41. There September admits that the child resided with Biyce in Utah, sometimes with her there and
sometimes with her living in California. R. 40-42.
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at Thanksgiving, Biyce was DreiTs primary caretaker. Biyce Aff.38 September unilaterally
moved Dreu and the other children to live witii her in Chubbuck, Idaho. She began to deny
Bryce was Dreu's father for the first time in late 1994.
10. Shortly after the divorce, September and Paul remarried, and then unilaterally
moved Dreu and the other children to live with them in Hawaii. They continue to deny
Bryce any contact with the children, or to even let him know of their new place of residence.
11. September has said that she "would like to have a DNA testing, I am more than
willing to submit to that. We can have that done as soon as possible I would hope."
Idaho Tr. 8 & 13.39 The parties had an agreement in principal to have paternity testing
performed,40 and testing is now believed to be in process.
12. The only real contact Biyce has been permitted with the children was at
Christmas, when the parties stipulated that all three children would have visitation with
Bryce on Christmas day for two and half hours. When the Christmas visit began, September
suggested that the visit should be overnight. That visit, which was carried out and went very
well, was memorialized in writing and signed by the parties.41
13. September and Paul move a lot, often leaving Dreu in the care of others. In the

™ R. 7-10, 124.
39

R. 37 and 42.

40

R.37,42.

41

R. 29.
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2l/2 years since Dreu's birth, September has resided in Utah, California, Utah again,
California again, Utah again, then Idaho and now Hawaii. Biyce Aff; Tr. 9.42
14. Biyce filed a Petition (this case) and Order to Show Cause for custody of Dreu,
and child support (and in the alternative for visitation). If paternity is challenged, he
requested that September be ordered to submit to and pay for immediate DNA testing. He
also requested visitation with the other children, Drai and Summer, and that September be
restrained from taking the children outside of the states of Utah and Idaho, and from
withholding access to them from Biyce.4'

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
If not reversed, the trial court will have declared that a natural father who has been
his child's primary caretaker cannot get access to the judicial system to establish any rights
or contact with his son. This is tine, per the trial court, even though he has also filed an
Acknowledgment of Paternity.
Commissioner Evans ruled sua sponte that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this
matter, and that the divorce decree between the respondents is res judicata, precluding any
court action, even though the respondents since remarried. Judge Peuler affirmed the
recommended dismissal, but based her rationale on strong "public policy" considerations
42

R. 38, 42, 44.

43

R. 2-6.
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dictating against allowing Bryce, who she said was a 'legal stranger" to his own child, to
interrupt the "intact family" of the Plattsmiers by litigating paternity. This she summarized
as "lack of standing."
Not only was the court in error, but the cruel result of that error is denying Biyce his
constitutional rights as a father who has largely raised his son ("Dreu"), and who as a result
of the mling is entirely denied a father's access. The Commissioner's mling (upheld
impliedly by the Judge) that a divorce to which he was not a party is res judicata is contrary
to law and in fact stark error. Bryce has no "standing" problem, and public policy supports
him, rather than being against him.

ARGUMENT
1. Plattsmiers are in default. Despite personal service on September, and although
she and Paul both appeared personally44 at the Show Cause hearing before Commissioner
Evans, the September and Paul Plattsmier at no time filed any answer or responsive pleading,
or even argued orally. This is true even to this date.45 This case is unusual, when it is
recognized that at the dial court level at least, the victorious parties are in total default
The appearance by Paul and September was a general appearance, and was not for purposes of any motion
to quash, dismiss, etc.
It is acknowledged, though, that in the last few days prior to the preparation of this brief, Plattsmiers and
Bryce have entered into a stipulation in the lower courts to at least undergo blood testing to confirm whether Bryce is
really Dreu's father. There is no agreement that the blood testing will in any manner render this matter moot, and no
party has requested a stay of this appeal. Even the respondents agree that the trial court was wrong and overly hasty in
denying even the right to determine paternity.
Appellant's Brief, Kraus v. Plattsmeir, 2

Default judgment was appropriate under Rule 55, URCP,40 but was not granted.

2. The allegations are admitted. This includes Bryce's paternity, the fact he was
the primary caretaker, that September got physical custody of Dreu only by deception, that
Paul and September reconciled, making their divorce a nullity, etc.
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than
those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the
responsive pleading. . . .
Rule 8(d), URCP (emphasis added). This is an issue separate and apart from whether a
technical default judgment was appropriate. See, Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d
164, 169 (Utah 1971). This issue relates to items being "deemed admitted", and not to
whether default judgment is appropriate. See also, Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 59547
(Ct. App. 1992), cert, granted and remand instructions revised on other grounds, 863 P.2d
534 (Utah 1992).
Read in conjunction with one another, Utah R.Civ.P. 55(a)(1) and (b)(2) state
that '[W]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought
has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules,' 'the party
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor.1 Further,
when allegations set forth in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when
not denied in the responsive pleading.
Stevens, supra, at 595 (emphasis supplied), citing to and quoting from Rule 8(d), URCP and
4

"When a party against whom a judgment lor affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his default."
47

Murdoch v. Blake, supra at 169.
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Murdoch v. Blake, supra at 169. Once the court deems the allegations admitted, it then may
consider the separate issue of whether those uncontroverted allegations entitle the applicant
to the relief sought. Stevens, supra at 595.48
Since Paul and September have never formally opposed any allegation in the Petition,
all of its claims are deemed admitted (even if entry of default and default judgment were not
appropriate). The truth of Bryce's allegations is deemed admitted here anyway, since
dismissal was on purely legal grounds. That being the case, the Court must assume the facts
in the light most favorable to the appealing party.
This assumption of the truth of the putative father's facts was the approach taken in
Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499 (Utah App. 1989). There it was the man declared to be
the father in the Divorce Decree who sought later to establish his lack of paternity. Like
Bryce here, he proffered notes and photographs as evidence, but, like Biyce, the trial court
dismissed his action and denied his request for paternity blood testing. 777 P.2d at 500.
This Court noted,"we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party." Id.
at 501. The trial court's refusal to allow the testing and a full hearing on paternity was
reversed, Id. at 504, as it should be here.

3. The trial court is entitled to no deference. See, Murdoch v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d

Citing Rajneesh Foundation Int'l. v. McGreer, 303 Or. 139, 142, 734 P.2d 87 1, 873 (Or. 1987).
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22, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971), Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 595 (Ct. App. 1992).49
The trial court here had a veiy small "pasture" within which to roam, and it is for this Court
to determine anew whether the trial judge has strayed beyond its fence line.50

T.R.F. v.

Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Utah App. 1988) (this standard is applied to interpretation of
paternity statutes).
Here the trial court has denied access to the court system based purely on the
allegations of Bryce, the Petitioner (now appellant), whose allegations must be deemed
admitted.

So it is submitted that here the trial court may be upheld only if an

"illegitimate" father who has primarily raised his child, and who has statutorily
acknowledged paternity, cannot even attempt to establish his fatherhood as against the
natural mother and her husband, to whom she has been married, divorced (with a
default decree naming her husband as father), and then married again. That cannot be
said to be true, and so dismissal of Bryce's petition as a matter of law cannot be sustained.
"An affirmance is the confirmation and ratification by an appellate court of a

Cert, granted and remand instructions revised on other grounds, 863 P.2d 534 (Utah 1992).
To the extent that a trial judge's pasture is small because he or she is fenced in closely by the appellate
courts and given little room to roam in applying a stated legal principal to the tact, the operative standard of review
approximates what can be described as wde novo'. That is, the appellate court closely and regularly redetermines the
legal effect of specific facts. But to the extent that the pasture is large, the trial judge has considerable freedom in
applying a legal principal to the fact, freedom to make decisions which appellate judges might not make themselves ab
initio but will not reverse — in effect, creating the freedom to be wrong without incurring reversal Only when the trial
court judge crosses an existing fence or when the appellate court feels comfortable in more closely defining the law by
fencing off a part of the pasture previously available does the trial judge's decision exceed the bread discretion granted.
State v. Perry, 1995 W.L. 410389 page 3 (Utah App. July 1995), quoting State v. Pena, 869 P2d 932 (Utah 1994).
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judgment, order, or decree of a lower court brought before it for review."51 What the court
did here cannot be ratified or sanctioned. It is entitled to no deference, and is plain wrong.52
The final order appealed from was the Order of Dismissal for Lack of Standing*
"Whether a plaintiff has standing is a question of law and we accord no deference to the
ruling of the trial court." West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police v. Nordfelt, 869 P.2d
948, 950 (Utah App. 1993).54

4. The trial court had no business dismissing sua sponte. Nobody requested
dismissal, and this case is a good example of why the trial courts should be waiy of doing
so on their own motions: they lack briefing or argument, and are more likely to make a snap
judgment without an accurate perspective of all the facts and legal authority.
Generally, a trial court may not dismiss an action when neither party has
sought dismissal and there is no notice or hearing on whether there exists a
justifiable cause for dismissal.
Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374, 1382 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis supplied).55 In the
Jenkins decision, this Court continues:

Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah App. 1993), citing Black's Law Dictionary
(1968 Edition).
52

SeeyP!attsv. Parents Helping Parents, 1995 W.L. 357774 page 1 (Utah App. June, 1995).

53

R. 114-115.

54

Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989).

55

Quoting Rubins v. Plummet; 813 P.2d 778 (Colo. App. 1990).
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Unless expressly granted authority to act on its own motion, a trial court
must typically limit its rulings to the motions placed before it. A trial court
has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented for determination.
Any findings rendered outside the issues [presented] are a nullity. Because
Weis did not make a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court plainly
erred when it dismissed Jenkins' causes of action without first giving
Jenkins notice and an opportunity to argue against dismissal.
Jenkins, supra, 868 P.2d at 1382 (emphasis supplied).56 Cf, Pniess v. Wilkerson, 858 P.2d
1662-1663 (Utah 1993) (trial court must give notice and an opportunity to be heard before
dismissing claim for failure to prosecute).
Raising an issue not addressed by the parties is inappropriate and outside of
the discretion given the governing tribunal because it encroaches upon the
advocate responsibility conferred upon counsel. Furthermore, if a party fails
to raise an issue and present evidence regarding the same, it has waived
the right to do so.
Hilton Hotel Pacific Reliance Insiir. v. Industrial Common. Of Utah, 1995 W.L. 339186
page 4 (Utah App. June, 1995) (emphasis added). In Hilton, this Court declared a "nullity"
the effort of the administrative tribunal to decide an issue (albeit properly before it), but on
grounds not urged by the parties. Id. at page 5.
The interests of justice are not enhanced when the court exceeds its role as
arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue that would otherwise be dead, it
not having been litigated at the time of trial.
Girardv. Appleby, 660 p.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983), quoted by Hilton Hotel, supra, at page
4; see also, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. V. Utah Stale Tax Comm >?., 847 P.2d 418, 420-421 (Utah

56

Authorities omitted were Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc. 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984), and
the Pruess and Rule 7(b), URCP citations included in body of argument, above.

App. 1993) ("it was improper for the Commission to sua sponte raise and decide an issue
that had not been raised by the parties").
"A trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented to it
for determination." Nielsen v. Nielsen, 780 P.2d 1264, 1271 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis
supplied) (Trial court not authorized to grant relief not requested; especially in favor of a
non-party57). Utah's leading case on sua sponte action by the courts seems to be Combe v.
Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984). That case stated:
It is an error to adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and
unsupported by the record. The trial court is not privileged to determine
matters outside the issues of the case, and if he does, his findings will have no
force or effect. In law or in equity, a judgment must be responsive to the
issues framed by the pleadings, and a trial court has no authority to render
a decision on issues not presented for determination. Any findings
rendered outside the issues are a nullity. A court may not grant judgment
for relief which is neither requested by the pleadings nor within the theory on
which the case was tried. . . .
Id., 680 P.2d at 736 (emphasis added, various citations to other states' courts omitted).

5. The divorce is not res judicata to bar Bryce. It does not estop or preclude Biyce
from seeking relief in this case. The Commissioner found that the Decree in the companion
divorce case58 was res judicata, and precludes Biyce from even claiming to be Dreu's father.

57

58

Accord, Butler v. Wilkinson. 740 P.2d 1244, 1263 (Utah 1987).
See, Plattsmier v. Plattsmier, Third District Court, Judge Murphy, Case # 94-490406 DA.
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On this basis he struck the Order to Show Cause and recommended dismissal of the matter.59
His recommendation was affirmed. Res judicata acts as follows:
It provides that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and,
as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a later action involving the same
claim, demand, or cause of action.
Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted).
It appears Commissioner Evans did not understand or at least did not properly apply the
standard. Judge Peuler based her affirmance of Commissioner Evans' dismissal on "lack of
standing" and "strong public policy",60 but did not specifically ovemile the res judicata
ruling of the Commissioner.
Since the status and welfare of children is rarely static, that "hyper-technical
application of res judicata is improper in adjudications where the welfare of children is at
stake." State in Interest ofJJ.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163 (Utah App. 1994).61

6. The characteristics for res judicata62 are not present. Commissioner Evans
R. 112 (Copy of Docket Page). This hearing has no separate minute entry or Order.
R. 111 (Minute Entry) and 114-115 (Order of Dismissal for Lack of Standing).
61

"Rather, to effectively determine the best interests of a child, a court must be free from the imposition of
artificial contrasts that serve merely to advance the cause of judicial economy." J.J.T., supra, 877 P.2d at 164, citation
omitted. This Court in J.J.T. saved "for another day the difficult question of whether, and to what extent, res judicata
really applies in the context of termination of parental rights," which was the type of case involved there.
62

The doctrine of res judicata states that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the
merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a later
action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah
App. 1993) (citations omitted).

heard no argument and had no briefing (or even a passing reference to the issue) before
ruling sua sponte that the divorce precluded this action by Bryce. Not surprisingly, he failed
to advisedly consider that res judicata requires three characteristics, and that none of them
applies in this case.
For res judicata to exist, the following must be present: (1) both actions must involve
"the same parties, their privies, or assignees; (2) the claim that is asserted to be barred must
have been such that it could have been presented in the first case; and (3) the first suit must
have resulted in a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction."
D'Aston v. D Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 350 (Utah App. 1992) (emphasis supplied).63 The three
elements are universal, though sometimes separated into four or five elements, or stated in
a different order. See, e.g., Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank, 580 P.2d 243 (Utah 1978).
They are known as the "Madsen Test."64
Here none of the Madsen elements is present. Biyce has not had the "day in court"
to which he is entitled. Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah App.
63

See, State Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App. 1992). V.G.P. held that
where a father had been an actual party to paternity case and had stipulated to paternity, the state could not later revisit
the issue to try to show he was not the •rear' lather. Id. See, Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah
App. 1993).
64

The test is named for Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 19SX). That case states the three
requirements that must be satisfied for res judicata to apply to preclude anything.
First, both cases must involved the same parties or privies.
Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must he
one that could and should have been raised in the first action.
Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Madsen, supra, 769 P.2d at 247 (emphasis supplied).
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1993). The parties are not the same, Bryce was not given notice of this case, the claims are
not the same, there was no dial or plenary hearing, but rather a default divorce, and the issue
of paternity was not presented to the Court; much less adjudicated. The three prongs are
discussed individually below.

7. The parties are not the same. This is the first prong of the Madsen Test.65 Biyce
was not a party to the divorce case between September and Paul Plattsmier, and was given
no notice or service of process. D 'Aston, supra, shows that persons other than the mamed
couple can sometimes be made parties to a divorce. There the parties' adult sons were held
bound by the Decree of Divorce, because their propeity rights were fully litigated at trial of
the matter, with their own attorneys present and heard. Id. At 350.
In this case the Commissioner would saddle Biyce with events in a default divorce
to which he was not a party and had no notice. Obviously he could not present his
arguments that he, not Paul, is Dreu's father. Paternity was not an "issue" in that divorce.
As stated in Sadleir v. Knapton, 296 P.2d 278, 279 (Utah 1956), "Except that it fixed
the marriage status of the parties thereto and the right of custody of the children, it is clear
that the divorce decree is not res judicata of the issues in this case because the defendant
was not a party to that action. Nor is plaintiff in any way estopped as against the
defendant here by that decree." Emphasis added. The rights determined in a divorce are

First, both cases must involved the same parties or privies.
Appellant's Brief. Kraus v. Plattsmeir. 11

primarily binding on the spouses; not third parties. Sadlier, Id. at 280. To hold otherwise,
would be to encourage the mischief or collusion that may have been the intent of Paul and
September, when they entered into their default decree purporting to determine custody, and
then almost immediately remarried. There is no bar. Sad/eir v. Knapton, 296 P.2d 278, 279
(Utah 1956) (Divorce decree is not res judicata as to persons who were not parties to the divorce).

8. The claims or issues are not the same. This is the second prong of the Madsen
Test.66 A divorce adjudication "becomes res judicata as to those issues which were either
tried and determined, or upon all issues which die party had a fair oppoitunity to present and
have determined in the other proceeding." D 'Aston v. D'Aston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App.
1992). Here there was no trial or plenary hearing, but rather a default divorce. And the issue
of paternity was not presented to the Court; much less adjudicated.
Where the two causes of action rest on different facts, and evidence of a
different kind or character is necessaiy to sustain them, the claims are not the
same for puiposes of res judicata.
State in Interest ofllT.,

877 P.2d 161, 164-165 (Utah App. 1994), citing Schaer v.

Department ofTransp., 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983).
Whether or not Paul and September colluded to file a phony divorce, the Court in
their divorce had no way to know that anyone else claimed to be Dreu's father, and could

Second, the claim that is alleged to be haired must have been presented in the first suit or must be one
that could and should have been raised in the first action. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988).
Appellant's Brief, Kraus v. Plattsmeir, 12

only rely on Paul's and September's false stipulation, which was essentially a fraud upon the
court. They certainly cannot be permitted to benefit from that fraud.67
"Claim preclusion is not applicable if the later proceeding is based on a different
claim, demand or cause of action" than was involved in the first case. State in Interest of
J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 164 (Utah App. 1994). In JJ.T. it was important that the two
proceedings examined were of a different nature, with different evidentiary requirements.
Id., 877 P.2d at 165. The same is certainly true here.
In this case there was no evidence required to "prove" Paul's paternity in the default
divorce proceeding. The matter simply was not adjudicated. And since Biyce was not a
party and his paternity was not alluded to in any part of that default divorce rote proceeding,
the issue of his being the natural father of Dreu could not have been adjudicated there.

9. There was no final judgment. This is the third prong of the Madsen Test.68 Here,
in fact, September and Paul "divorced" but then almost immediately remarried. Since the
terms of their divorce have no application as between them, it cannot be argued that
they nevertheless still apply to a legal stranger to that case.
This case is somewhat analogous to Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). There
67

"It is well established that the court has the power to vacate an order or judgment procured by extrinsic
fraud." State v. Schreiber, 121 Utah 653, 245 P.2d 222 (Utah 1952), citing 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, Sec. 735; Rice v.
Rice, 212 P.2d 685 (Utah).
68

Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Madsen, supra, 769 P.2d at
247 (emphasis supplied).
Ann&///int\'
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a former husband who acknowledged in a decree that he was the father, was held not
estopped to try to avoid support of a child that was not in fact his. The court rejected the
argument that failure to estop him would prevent the child from seeking support.
It is true here that the plaintiff consented to be named as the father on the birth
certificate and that he caused the decree of divorce between him and the
defendant to reflect that the boy was issue of their marriage. However, that
conduct in and of itself is insufficient to establish detriment[al reliance]. . . .
[N]o legal authority is cited for the proposition that plaintiffs
representations to the 1976 divorce court preclude the boy, who was not
a party to that action, from obtaining support from his biological father.
Wiese, Id. at 703 (emphasis added). Not only Bryce, but Dreu have a strong interest in
reviving their cruelly terminated relationship.

10. Collateral Estoppel does not apply either. The above discussion related to
"pure res judicata, or "claim preclusion." There is said to be a second branch, known as
"issue preclusion", and traditionally known as collateral estoppel.69

This "prevents

relitigation of issues that have been decided, though the causes of action or claims for relief
are not the same." State in Interest ofJ.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163 (Utah App. 1994).70
Res judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim
preclusion prevents relitigation of claims that have been fully litigated
between the same parties, and also precludes claims which 'could and should
have been litigated in the prior action, but were not raised/ Issue preclusion,
or collateral estoppel, applies when the issues have been litigated in the
Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 3X9 (Utah App. 1987).
70

Citing PenroJ v. V// Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873. 875 (Utah 1983): Copper Stale Thrift & Loan v.
Bnmo, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah App. 1987).
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context of a different cause of action. In order for issue preclusion to apply,
the issue in the first case must have been competently, fully and fairly
litigated.
Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis supplied).71
There is no indication that Commissioner Evans or Judge Peuler intended to apply
collateral estoppel or claim preclusion as a specie of res judicata. This would be impossible
anyway since, again, Bryce was not a party to the divorce action between Paul and
September.72 Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985) (Default divorce Decree purporting to
determine custody not estoppel to later claim the husband is not the natural father); Masters, supra,
111 P.2d at 503 (claim preclusion/collateral estoppel only applies if the party against whom
it is asserted was actually a party to the prior action).
The divorce court had no way to know that anyone else claimed to be Dreif s father,
and could only rely on Paul and September's inaccurate stipulation, which was essentially
a fraud upon the Court. There was no final judgment. Here, in fact, September and Paul
"divorced" but then almost immediately remarried. Since the terms of their divorce no
longer have any application as between them, it cannot be argued that they nevertheless
still apply to a legal stranger to that divorce case.

Omitted in the quote were several citations to Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389
(Utah App. 1987).
7

If collateral estoppel type res judicata could be applied because the parties were the same, "we must
consider not only whether the [earlier] proceeding has preclusive effect because of claims actually litigated, but also
whether [the precluded party] could and should have brought" the new issues when the earlier case was pending. State
in Interest ofJ\JT., 877 P.2d 161, 163 (Utah App. 1994).
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11. The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel illustrates the trial court's folly. The related
doctrine of "judicial estoppefis similarly inapplicable, but a quick look at it illustrates again
why the earlier default divorce cannot affect this paternity case. The doctrine of judicial
estoppel is based on the idea that once a matter has been determined, the parties tend to live
in reliance on the detemiination and should not later have the issue decided again. This was
raised and rejected as an alternative to res judicata and collateral estoppel in Masters, supra,
777P.2dat503.
According to [the mother], [her husband] cannot contend that he is not the
children's biological father because in a prior judicial proceeding, the divorce
proceeding, the court found [him] to be the father.
In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv.. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d
388, 390 (Utah 1942), the Utah Supreme Court said that a party invoking
judicial estoppel must show that he or she has done something or omitted to
do something in reliance on the other party's testimony in the earlier
proceeding, and will be prejudiced if the facts are different from those upon
which he or she relied. Id. However, 'there is no estoppel where there was no
reliance and the parties had equal knowledge of the facts.' Id. 132 P.2d at
390-91. \n Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah
1971), the court clarified that the doctrine was really akin to collateral
estoppel and applied only to issues actually litigated, not those which could
have been determined. The purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the
integrity of the judicial process from conduct such as a knowing
misrepresentation or a fraud on the process from conduct such as a knowing
misrepresentation or a fraud on the court.
Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 504 (Utah App. 1989). Here, preclusion theories are
being applied by the trial court to sanction a fraud, perpetiated on the court by Paul and
September in a case where Bryce was not a party.
September's and Paul's behavior in "stipulating" that Dreu was Paul's child is similar
Appellant's Brief, Kraus v. Plattsmeir, 16

to the conduct of the unfaithful wife in McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 200, 494 P.2d 283
(Utah 1972). There the parties' original divorce stated that Mr. McGavin was the father of
their child, but he later learned that it was the product of an extramarital affair. She urged
that he should not be pennitted to come back and undue what was done; that he should not
be permitted to show her fraud on the court, because of a claimed res judicata or estoppel
effect of the original Divorce Decree. Id. at 284. This effort was, of course, rejected73 by
the Utah Supreme Court. Id., 494 P.2d at 284.

12. Due process required paternity testing. Yet here there was hardly even a
hearing and absolutely no briefing on the issue the Commissioner used to deny all relief.
"The demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand
a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved, [citations omitted].
One of the fundamental requirements of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard."
Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157, 164 (Utah App. 1992) (a custody jurisdiction case),
Emphasis supplied.
The Commissioner denied Biyce his due process rights when, without briefing or even

Somehow the courts frown on such matrimonial machinations where adult persons seek,
for their own personal reasons, be it for money or support, or support for spite, to
illegitimatize an innocent child, who under such circumstances, best would have lenuiined
birthless. One wonders whether the vernacular appellation anent illegitimates better might
else apply to others than the infant.
McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 200, 494 P.2d 283, 284 (Utah 1972).

opposition, he denied not only any custody or visitation rights, but refused to even require
paternity testing, then dismissed the case. His faulty theory was that the September v. Paul
divorce action was binding on the issue of whether Bryce is Dreifs father.74

13. Bryce has standing. Although no one requested it, Judge Peuler ruled that the
paternity and custody action should be dismissed based on the notion that Biyce lacked
"standing".75 "Whether a plaintiff has standing is a question of law and we accord no
deference to the ruling of the trial court." West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police v.
Nordfelt, 869 P.2d 948, 950 (Utah App. 1993).
Standing is a matter of asserting the plaintiffs own rights. Baird v. State, 574 P.2d
713, 717 (Utah 1978). "In order to have standing, a plaintiff must show some distinct and
palpable injury giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute." West Valley
City Fraternal Order of Police v. Nordfelt, supra, 869 P.2d at 950; Harris v. Spring\Hlle City,
712P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1984).
Clearly Biyce has unique rights to his own (albeit illegitimate) child, especially
having been a primary caretaker and having filed an acknowledgment of paternity. The

There was a suggestion by the Commissioner that a motion could perhaps be made to intervene in that case
and reopen it, and such an avenue may be attempted. The Commissioner denied an oral motion to consolidated that case
with this one. Bryce retains his right to bring such a motion in that other case at such time as it becomes appropriate.
My ruling is that the Commissioner's recommendation is affirmed. I frankly think the flaw
in this lawsuit is that this petitioner has no standing to bring this action.
I simply don't thing he has any standing to bring this action and I believe the
Commissioner's recommendation was the correct one. R. 129-130.
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standing issue in this case is more clearly conti'olled by State in the Interest of J. W.F. ("JWF
II"), 799 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990). This was a partial reversal of State in the Interest of
J.W.F. ("JWFI"), 763 P.2d 1217 (Utah App. 1988).76
The JWF cases all arose from the efforts of a putative father (Mr. Schoolcraft) to seek
custody of his child, after the mother's rights had been terminated. To make a long stoiy
short, Schoolcraft had been found at the trial court not to be the natural father of the child,
but he had been married to the mother when the child was bom. The Court of Appeals found
in JWF I77 that once Schoolcraft was found not to be the biological father, he lacked standing
to argue for custody. The Supreme Court reversed in JWF II,78 holding that to deny standing
on this basis was "too mechanistic and, consequently, is insufficiently sensitive to the
legitimate policy considerations Schoolcraft raises."79 Before proceeding further with the
discussion of the JWF cases, it should be noted that Schoolcraft stood in the position Paul
Plattsmier should stand in here; not that of Bryce, whose position is much stronger since he
is the natural, publicly acknowledged father.

14. "Public policy" does not rigidly bar Bryce's action. Judge Peuler was greatly

76

There is also a "JWF III", State in the Interest of J.W.F. ("JWF III"), 822 P.2d 1218 (Utah App. 1991).
JWF III contains little or nothing pertinent to this controversy, or which reverses any of the relevant portions of JWF II.
77

State in the Interest of J. W.F f 'JWFI"), 763 P.2d 1217 (Utah App. 1988)

78

State in the Interest of J.W.F (VWFII"), 799 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990).

79

State in the Interest of J.W.F ("JWF IF'), 799 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990) (emphasis added).
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concerned (in her unsolicited sua sponte legal theorizing) that Paul and September are:
an intact family, and I believe that there is very strong public policy against
allowing a legal stranger to intervene, to disrupt, to invade a family and
claim custody or visitation over a child where there are both parents in the
home being a family to that child.
R. 11 (emphasis added). See also, her comments at R. 7, 8. The court is correct that public
policy protects the family, but (without the benefit of any motion or briefing) she has
misunderstood and misapplied that policy.

All the reasons for preserving family

relationships bode in favor of Bryce in this case, not September and Paul. Judge Peuler's
holding is actually against the controlling decisions.
We agree that, as a general matter, the class of persons permitted to challenge
the presumption of paternity should be limited, as he argues, but we reject the
notion that the legal status of the prospective challenger is the only relevant
factor, as the court of appeals held. In determining who can challenge the
presumption of legitimacy, a paramount consideration should be preserving the
stability of the marriage and protecting children from disruptive and
unnecessaiy attacks upon their paternity. Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393,
395, 518 P.2d 687, 689 (Utah 1974); Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d at 165, 340
P.2d at 763. This leads us to conclude that whether individuals can
challenge the presumption of legitimacy should depend not on their legal
status alone, but on a case-by-case determination of whether the abovestated policies would be undermined by permitting the challenge.
J. W.F., 799 P.2d at 713 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court went on to note that since
the child there had no expectation as to who his father was, public policy did not deprive
Schoolcraft, a step-father, of access. He had standing, said the court. Id.80 Clearly the

JWF II also held that the guardian ad litem had standing. 799 P.2d at 713. This is summarized in JWF III
as well. 822P.2dat 1218.
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natural father, here Biyce, would have standing, paiticularly if he has cared for the child and
been known as his udaddy Biyce''.81
By allowing her view of "public policy" protecting the September/Paul family (which
did not really exist until at least last December or January) to override the rights of Biyce,
Judge Peuler in essence allowed a ubest interest" test to supplant the "fundamental rights"
of Biyce as a parent.
Because [the father] had a substantial relationship with the child, the
termination of his parental rights by application of the paternity statute or by
a utilization of the 'best interests' standard would violate his due process
liberties.
T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 914 (Utah App. 1988). T.R.F. goes on in footnote to sum up
Bryce's mistreatment by the trial court here:
We are also troubled by the trial court's treatment of. . . the child's natural
father, throughout this procedurally protracted case. [The father] sought an
evidentiaiy hearing to determine permanent custody and to determine
visitation privileges with his child while this case was pending. The trial court
denied each of [the father's] requests. . . . [T]he trial court continued to
refuse [the father] visitation with his child even though he had exercised
visitation privileges with his child the child's entire life. This denial is
problematic since the court had yet to decide who would have permanent
custody of the child and it would seem in the child's best interests to maintain
a relationship with her natural father until his parental rights were finally
determined.
Id., Fn. 3, 760 P.2d at 916 (emphasis added). Here the trial court dismissed the entire case
and struck the Order to Show Cause, effectively supporting September's refusal to allow

1

See e.g., R. 93.
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Bryce to have even visitation with Dreu.

15. Bryce showed commitment to Dreu; he is not a "legal stranger", JWF II held:
It may be that no one has the same rights toward a child as his or her parents.
See, Wilson v. Family Services Div.., Region Two, 554 P.2d 227, 230 (Utah
1976). However, the fact that a person is not a child's natural or legal parent
does not mean that he or she must stand as a total stranger to the child where
custody is concerned. Certain people, because of the their relationship to a
child, are at least entitled to standing to seek a determination as to whether it
would be in the best interest of the child for them to have custody. See id.
799 P.2d at 714 (Utah 1990). The Supreme Court there went on to point out that such
persons as grandparents, step-parents, and even "next of kin" may be granted standing to
seek custody. Id. At715. 82
Here, Bryce is the natural father, and he has held a strong relationship with Dreu.
Until September spirited Dreu out of state last Thanksgiving, Bryce

had a stronger

connection than anyone else, including her. Paul was a step-father who had, until then,
hardly associated with Dreu. Since then it may be assumed that he has been acting as his
father. This does not deprive Bryce of standing; it simply means Paul may also have
standing.83 There should be a full determination of the best interests of the child, rather than

"[W]hile only parents have vested rights to the custody of children, next of kin, such as this grandmother, do
have some dormant or inchoate right or interest in the custody and welfare of the children who become parentless, so
that they may come forward and assert their claim. . . . [Ijnchoate rights entitle the relative to standing to such a hearing
to determine custodial fitness." J. IV.F. II, 799 P.2d 710, 715 (cites omitted).
83

"In a custody case . . . all things else being equal, near relatives should generally be given preference over
non-relatives." JWFII, 799 P.2d at 715, citing //; re: Cooper, 17 Utah 2d 296, 29X, 410 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1966).
Here Co-appellee Paul Plattsmier is the non-relative step-father, and Appellant Bryce Kraus is the near blood relative.
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the trial couit's aitificial and mechanistic84 sua sponlc detennination, which more resembles
"finders-keepers" than rational decision making.
There is no reason to narrowly restrict participation in custodial
proceedings. Indeed, our case law and the legislature's pronouncements
indicate that the interests of the child are best served when those interested in
the child are permitted to assert that interest. The question of who should
have custody of the child is too important to exclude participants on
narrowly drawn grounds, as did the court of appeals. Those who have legal
or personal connections with the child should not be precluded from being
heard on best interests.
J.W.F. II 799 P.2d at 716 (emphasis added).
«/. W.F. II went on to note (as had the Court of Appeals in./. IV.R I) that standing to
seek custody is always conferred if there is a legal obligation to support the child. 799 P.2d.
at 716. That responsibility is set forth by statute: "Every father shall support his child. . . ."
Section 78-45-3(1), Utah Code (1995). Similarly, Section 78-45-4.2, Utah Code (1979)
holds that the natural parent has the "primary obligation of support", which supersedes the
step-parent's liability. And Section 78-45a-l states:
The father of a child that is or may be bora outside of maniage is liable to the
same extent as the father of a child bom within maniage . . . for the reasonable
expense of the mother pregnancy and confinement and for the education,
necessary support , and any funeral expenses for the child. For puiposes of
child support collection, a child born outside the marriage includes a child
born to a married woman by a main other than her husband if that paternity
has been established.
Id. (1990) (emphasis supplied).

84

See,JWFII, 799 P.2d at 714. ("Again, we find this analytical approach to be too mechanical").
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If the court determines that the alleged father is the father, it may upon its own
motion or upon motion of the father, order visitation rights in accordance with
Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37 as it considers appropriate under the
circumstances.
Section 78-45a-10.5(l), Utah Code (1994).

16. What the trial court did to Bryce's paternal rights was unconstitutional. If
this Decree were left to stand, it would deprive Bryce and his son of all future contact.
We recognize that an unwed fatiier's interest in personal contact with his child
acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause when the
father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood
by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child.
Adoption ofC.MXl, 869 P.2d 997 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis added, citations omitted);
Lehrv. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2993, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). This
Biyce has done in spades, and probably more so than has the mother, September. To leave
this case intact would be way outside constitutional bounds, and downright inhumane
besides. "Fathers who have fulfilled a parental role over a considerable period of time
are entitled to a high degree of protection

" In re: J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).

The Utah Supreme Court has held that the Utah Constitution, Art. I Sees. 7 and 25,
"guarantees parents a fundamental right to sustain relationships with" their children. Matter
ofK.B.E., 740 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1987).

The Federal Constitution provides similar

protection. Amendment 5, 14; K.B.E., supra, where the unwed father has shown that he is
willing to support the child and develop a relationship with him. And in such circumstances,
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foreclosing fathers would violate the Equal Protection clause. Ellis v. Social Services Dept.,
L.D.S., 615 P.2d 1250, 1255.85
Court access should not be denied to Bryce. See, Art. 1 Sec. 11 (Open Courts with
remedies guaranteed) and Ait. I Sec. 24 (Due Process), Utah Constitution.

17. The acknowledgment of paternity further strengthens Bryce's rights. He filed
the acknowledgment, and no one has ever filed an action to terminate his parental rights, or
to adopt his child Dreu. Such an acknowledgment itself creates constitutional rights to the
child. Matter ofK.B.E., 740 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah App. 1987). It guarantees him standing in
proceedings which may deny him access to his child. See, T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 913,
913-914 (Utah App. 1988), citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-266, 103 S.Ct. 2985,
2995-2996, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983).
Bryce is quite similar to the illegitimate but biological father in T.R.F.:
Here, Felan did not sit on his rights for eleven years of his child's life. Rather,
he complied with the requirements of Utah's acknowledgment statute by
publicly acknowledging the child and holding the child out as his own from
the child's birth. He was identified as the child's father on his child's birth
certificate and baptismal record. He and the child's mother established a home
together after the child's birth. He continued to visit the child even after the
parties' separation and he contributed to the support of the child. Unlike the
natural father in [another case], he seeks actual and legal custody of his child.

85

"The relationship between parent and child is protected by the federal and state constitutions-." In re: J.P.,
648P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).
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T.R.F v. Felan, 760 P.2d 913, 914 (Utah App. 1988). Here Biyce was openly acknowledged
as the father of Dr6u until recently. He and Dreu's mother, September, made a home
together, both at the time Dreu was conceived and for most of his life, until September took
him away by pretense last November. His surname "Kraus" was put on Dreu's birth
ceitificate, and when September staited pretending he was not the natural father, he filed an
acknowledgment of paternity with the Department of Health to protect his rights.
Such an acknowledgment is a strong vehicle.
A voluntary declaration of paternity filed in compliance with this chapter
establishes a father-child relationship identical to the relationship
established when a child is born to persons married to each other.
Section 78-45e-2(l)(a), Utah Code (1995). Biyce is the father, and his formerly illegitimate
status is changed to parenthood by his compliance with the above statute, with all its rights
and responsibilities.
Bryce's acknowledgment was timely, since it may be filed "any time after the birth
of the child" so long as there has not been a prior consent or relinquishment for adoption,86
which there has not been here. However, the acknowledgment does not, of course, bear the
signature of the birth mother.87

In light of the constitutional rights set forth above, any

attempt in the statute to allow the mother alone to control the validity of the father's
acknowledgment would be unconstitutional.

86

Section 78-45e-2(3), Utah Code (1995).

87

Section 78-45e-2(3), Utah Code (1995).
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18. There is no presumption that bars this action. One of the bases recited by the
Commissioner for his suasponte rejection of this effort is the claim that since September and
Paul were married when Dreu was bom (though September lived with Biyce when he was
conceived), he is somehow conclusively presumed to be Paul's child, notwithstanding
anything Bryce might assert. Although this error was pointed out to Judge Peuler, she
adopted it wholesale.
The presumption of legitimacy is rooted in common law, and is called "Lord
Mansfield's Rule".88 Even that old rule, which has been considerably eroded by Utah's
legitimacy statute, is inapplicable here. It only applies to prevent the husband and wife from
denying legitimacy. See footnote 82. It does not apply to Biyce, who is not a party to that
marriage (or subsequent divorce, or subsequent remaniage). It was eroded by the enactment
of Section 78-25-18, Utah Code. That statute states in part:
In any civil action or bastardy proceedings in which the parentage of a person
is a relevant fact, the court shall order the child and alleged parents to submit
to blood tests.
Id. (1955). See also the statutes which validate the tests and govern their use. Sections 7825-19-et seq., Utah Code (1955). Failure of the trial court to require blood testing is a
clear violation of that statute.
88

Goodnight v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591. 98 Eng.Reprint 1257(1777), wherein Lord Mansfield said: "fcit is a rule
founded in decency, morality, and policy that they [husband and wife] should not be permitted to say after marriage that
the offspring is spurious."
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Notwithstanding those statutes, Judge Peuler adopted Commissioner Evans' raw
misunderstanding of the Lord Mansfield's Rule, which is codified and limited in Utah's
legitimacy statute, which reads in part:
Except as provided in Section 78-45a-l, children bom to the parties after the
date of the marriage shall be deemed the legitimate children of both of the
parties for all purposes.
Section 30-1-17.2 (1990). Too quick a look at this language could mislead one to believe
the Commissioner and Judge were right. However, it speaks in terms of "legitimacy", not
"paternity", which "may involve two different determinations.

Legitimacy addresses

whether a child was conceived or born in wedlock, while paternity is a question of
biological fatherhood." Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah App. 1989), citing
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1982). The statute is irrelevant, and provides no
bar or obstacle to Biyce. If it did, he is permitted a hearing to overcome the presumption.
Further, the legitimacy statute expressly excludes actions under Section 78-45a-l,
Utah Code (1990), the "Uniform Act of Paternity." This underscores the fact that paternity
is not controlled in any fashion by the presumed legitimacy statute.

19. September and Paul have Unclean hands. Their divorce was a fraud upon the
Court, as alluded to above. Most important was the false statement that Paul was the father.
In Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 501-502 (Utah App. 1989), like here, the wife lied
to the divorce court, knowing all the while that it was likely that her lover, not her husband,
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was the father of her three children. 'Therefore, we find that there are facts alleged on the
issue of fraud, which, if viewed most favorably to [husband], state a cause of action for
fraud. As a result, the trial court could not grant summary judgment on the basis of failure
to state a cause of action." Id. At 502. The same error or worse occurred here.

CONCLUSION & RELIEF SOUGHT
The Commissioner's and Judge's hasty sua sponle dismissal of Bryce's claim were
based on errors of law and an incomplete hearing of the facts. The State and Federal
Constitutions do not permit the Court to flatly deny Bryce his right to prove paternity and
litigate for custody and visitation, paiticularly in light of the fact that he has assumed the role
of father to the fullest throughout most of Dreu's life.
There is no presumption — much less one that is conclusive — that Paul is Dreu's
father and Biyce is not. Paternity testing should be accomplished, and Bryce should have
his full hearing on whether he is entitled to custody of Dreu, and alternatively as to what
visitation should be ordered.
Respectfully submitted the 7th day of September, 1995.

Mitchell R. Barker, Attorney for Appellant
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September Plattsmier
Paul Plattsmier
522 B Shower Place
Honolulu, Hawaii 95818
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Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
Attorney for Petitioner
3530 South 6000 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120-2610
Telephone (801) 963-6558

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

BRYCE L. KRAUS,
Petitioner,
vs.
SEPTEMBER PLATTSMIER and
PAUL PLATTSMIER,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
FOR LACK OF STANDING
Civil No. 940907741 PA
Judge Peuler
Commissioner Evans

Respondents.

On December 12, 1994 this action was filed by plaintiff Bryce Kraus against respondents
September and Paul Plattsmier, seeking a declaration of his paternity as to Dreu Kraus Plattsmier,
together with custody and child support. Respondents were ordered to appear before the Court on
February 9, 1995. On that date, the natter came before the Honorable Michael S. Evans,
Commissioner/Judge Pro Tern. Petitioner appeared personally and through his counsel, Mitchell R.
Barker. Respondents September and Paul Plattsmier both appeared personally as pro se litigants.
Commissioner Evans struck the hearing sua sponte without hearing argument on the merits,
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and recommended sua sponte that the matter be dismissed. Petitioner timely objeGted and briefed his
objections.
On March 24, 1995 the Petitioner's Objection came for hearing pursuant to proper notice
before the Honorable Sandra Peuler, Third District Judge. Petitioner appeared personally and
through counsel, Mitchell R. Barker. Respondents did not appear, personally or through counsel.
Having heard argument on behalf of Petitioner, and good cause appearing, this matter is hereby
ORDERED dismissed on the basis that petitioner lacks standing to assert paternity, siae*

S**/°
respondents were iimnicd (albeit ucpuruted) when DrciHfaaus ridllsmiei' was=kefa^ The
Commissioner's recommendation is affirmed.
So ordered and decreed this f(p

day of May, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

2i ! ^ g
A*M^~J
Sindra N. Peuler, Third District Jud
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On the 29th day of April, 1995,1 certify that I mailed a copy of the fofegoing proposed order
to the following persons at the addresses indicated:
September Plattsmier
Paul Plattsmier
4895 Trent Avenue
Chubbick, Idaho 83202
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30-1-17.2

HUSBAND AND WIFE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Annulment of
Marriage §§ 3-42.
C.J-S. — 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 50.
AX.R. — Concealment of or misrepresentation as to prior marital status as ground for
annulment of marriage, 15 A.L.R.3d 759.
Concealment or misrepresentation relating
to religion as ground for annulment, 44
A.L.R.3d 972.
What constitutes mistake in the identity of
one of the parties to warrant annulment of
marriage, 50 A.L.R.3d 1295.
Incapacity for sexual intercourse as ground

for annulment, 52 A.L.R.3d 589.
Spouse's secret intention not to abide by
written antenuptial agreement relating to financial matters as ground for annulment, 66
A.L.R.3d 1282.
Validity of marriage as affected by lack of
legal authority of person solemnizing it, 13
A.L.R.4th 1323.
Homosexuality, transvestism, and similar
sexual practices as grounds for annulment of
marriage, 68 A.L.R.4th 1069.
Key Numbers. — Marriage <£* 58.

30-1-17.2. Action to determine validity of marriage —
Orders relating to parties, property, and children — Legitimacy of children.
(1) If the parties have accumulated any property or acquired any obligations
subsequent to the marriage, if there is a genuine need arising from an
economic change of circumstances due to the marriage, or if there are children
born or expected, the court may make temporary and final orders, and
subsequently modify the orders, relating to the parties, their property and
obligations, the children and their custody and visitation, and the support and
maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable.
(2) Except as provided in Section 78-45a-l, children born to the parties after
the date of their marriage shall be deemed the legitimate children of both of
the parties.
History: C. 1953, 30-1-17.2, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 65, § 3[a]; 1990, ch. 245, § 1.

Cross-References. — Nunc pro tunc entry
of orders, § 30-4a-l.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
after an annulment supported court's rejection
of plaintiff's petition for reinstatement of alimony from first marriage after annulment of
second marriage. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 564
P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977).

ANALYSIS

Lord Mansfield rule.
Reinstatement of alimony.
Settlement.
Cited.
Lord Mansfield rule.
The Lord Mansfield Rule, whereby spouses
may not give testimony which would tend to
illegitimatize child born to wife during the
marriage, was adopted. Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah
2d 393, 518 R2d 687 (1974).

Settlement.
Court which granted annulment had authority to grant wife a $1,200 settlement to enable
her and her son by a prior marriage to return to
her native Thailand. Maple v. Maple, 566 P.2d
1229 (Utah 1977).

Reinstatement of alimony.
Authorization by this section of an award

Cited in Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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30-1-29

iMARRIAGE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note,
J. W.F v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's Rights to
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law,
1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 955.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Annulment of
Marriage §§ 92-104.
C.J.S. — 55 C.J.S. Marriage §§ 62-66.
AX.R. — Custody: power of court which
denied divorce legal separation, or annulment
to award custody or make provisions for support of child 7 A.L.R.3d 1096.
Annulment of later marriage as revivmg
prior husband's obligations under alimony decree or separation agreement, 45 A.L.R.3d
^QOQ
Presumption of legitimacy of child born after
annulment, divorce, or separation, 46 A.L.R.3d
158.

Antenuptial contract or settlement conditioned upon marriage, enforcement where marriage was subsequently declared void, 46
A.L.R.3d 1403.
Paternity findings or implications in divorce
o r annulment decree or in support or custody
m a d e incident thereto, effect in subsequent
proceedings, 78 A.L.R.3d 846.
^ a i i o w a n c e 0 f permanent
A l i m o n y : right
^
alim
m fxmneetkin
d e c r e e of a n n u l .
me

g l A L R 3d 2 g l

„
,
, ,
r
.. ?«50veiy for services rendered by persons
living m apparent relation of husband and wife
without express agreement for compensation,
94
A.L.R.3d 552.
Key Numbers. — Marriage <&=> 61-65.

30-1-17.3. Age as basis of action to determine validity of
marriage — Refusal to grant annulment.
If an action to determine the validity of a marriage is commenced upon the
ground that one or both of the parties were prohibited from marriage because
of their age, in addition to all of the foregoing provisions, the following shall
apply: The provisions of this code regarding marriage by a person or persons
under the age of consent to the contrary notwithstanding, the court may, in its
discretion, refuse to grant an annulment if it finds that it is in the best interest
of the parties or their children, to refuse the annulment. The refusal shall
make the marriage valid and subsisting for all purposes.
History: C. 1953, 30-1-17.3, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 65, § 3[b].

Cross-References. — Marriage by minors,
§ 30-1-9.

30-1-17.4. Action for annulment or divorce as alternative
relief.
Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the filing of an action
requesting an annulment or a divorce as alternative relief.
History: C. 1953, 30-1-17.4, enacted by L.
1971, ch.65, § 4.

30-1-18 to 30-1-29.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Sections 30-1-18 to 30-1-25 (L.
1941, ch. 36, §§ 1 to 5, 7, 8; C. 1943, 40-1-18 to
40-1-22; 40-1-24, 40-1-25; L. 1943, ch. 47, § 1;
1945, ch. 64, § 1; 1951, ch. 49, § 1; 1975, ch. 80,
§ 1), relating to premarital examinations for
venereal diseases, were repealed by Laws 1981,
ch. 126, § 1.

Laws 1988, ch. 154, § 4 repeals §§ 30-1-26 to
30-1-29, as enacted by Laws 1969, ch. 73, §§ 1
to 4, and amended by Laws 1977, ch. 145, § 12,
relating to marriage by persons under prior
support obligations, effective April 25,1988.
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30-3-30. Appropriation to pilot program to cover costs of
impecunious parties.
Each party who is unable to pay the costs of mediation may attend mediation
without payment upon a prima facie showing of impecuniosity as evidenced by
an affidavit of impecuniosity filed in the district court. In those instances, the
independent contractor shall be reimbursed for its costs from the appropriations for the "Domestic Relations Mandatory Mediation Pilot Program." Before
a decree of divorce shall be entered, the court shall make a final review and
determination of impecuniosity and may order the payment of the costs if so
determined.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-30, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 158, § 14.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch 158

became effective on April 27,1992, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

30-3-31. Review of pilot program.
(1) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall adopt a program to
evaluate the effectiveness of the mandatory mediation pilot program. Progress
reports shall be provided semi-annually on the date of implementation of this
section and on the results beginning July 1,1994. The results shall be reported
to the Judiciary Interim Committee on a bi-annual basis.
(2) The Administrative Office of the Courts may make recommendations to
the Judiciary Interim Committee on methods to make the program fiscally
solvent, if necessary, including the increase in marriage license fees, divorce
filing fees, or mediation fees.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-31, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 158, § 15.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch 158

became effective on April 27,1992, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

30-3-32. Visitation — Intent — Policy — Definitions.
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote visitation at a level
consistent with all parties' interests.
(2) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or
substantiated potential harm to the child:
(a) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, tUywwd^or
adjudicated parents to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing • » • • •
to each parent following separation or divorce;
^__ ^
eti
(b) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is
^^j^SS
responsible for frequent, meaningful, and continuing access1
consistent with the child's best interests; and
(c) it is in the best interests of the child to have 1
involved in parenting the child.
(3) For purposes of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37: ^ ^
(a) "Child" means the child or children of divort&H^
adjudicated parents.
(b) "Christmas school vacation" means the time penofll
evening the child gets out of school for the Christmas ^
the evening before the child returns to school, except fori
Christmas Day, and New Year's Day.
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(c) "Extended visitation" means a period of visitation other than a
weekend, holiday as provided in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g),
religious holidays as provided in Subsections 30-3-33(4) and (16), and
"Christmas school vacation."
Higtory: C. 1953, 30-3-32, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 131, § 2.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131

became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

30-3-33. Advisory guidelines.
In addition to the visitation schedule provided in Section 30-3-35, advisory
guidelines are suggested to govern all visitation arrangements between
parents. These advisory guidelines include:
(1) visitation schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are
preferable to a court-imposed solution;
(2) the visitation schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity
and stability of the child's life;
(3) the court may alter this schedule to make shorter visits of greater
frequency or other arrangements consistent with the child's best interests
for children under age 5; otherwise the visitation schedule as provided in
Section 30-3-35 shall apply;
(4) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child
available to attend family functions induing funerals, weddings, family.
reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant
events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which may
inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule;
(5) the noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times specified
and return the child at the times specified, and the child's regular school
hours shall not be interrupted;
(6) the custodial parent shall have the child ready for visitation at the
time he is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or
shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the
time he is returned;
(7) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reasonably accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the
visitation allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the
standardized visitation provided in Section 30-3-35;;
(8) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reasonably accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of
exercising visitation;
(9) neither visitation nor child support is to be withheld due to either
parent's failure to comply with a court-ordered visitation schedule;
(10) the custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and
community functions in which the child is participating or being honored,
and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate
fully;
(11) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school
reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical records and
shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the event of a
medical emergency;
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(12) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and
telephone number within 24 hours of any change;
(13) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact
during reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges with the child;
(14) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in
allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able, to provide child care;
(15) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the
name, current address, and telephone number of the other parent and
shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current address, and
telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for good
cause orders otherwise; and
(16) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious
holidays celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a
religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the
right to be together with the child on the religious holiday.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-33, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 131, § 3.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131

became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25.

30-3-34. Best interests — Rebuttable presumption.
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, the court may
establish a visitation schedule consistent with the best interests of the child.
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the visitation schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 shall be presumed to be in the best
interests of the child. The visitation schedule shall be considered the minimum
visitation to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled
unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.
The presumption may be rebutted based upon a finding of the court including
any of the following criteria:
(a) visitation would endanger the child's physical health;
(b) visitation would significantly impair the child's emotional development;
(c) a substantiated allegation of child abuse exists;
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills;
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate
food and shelter for the child during periods of visitation;
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be of
sufficient maturity;
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure
youth corrections facility, or an adult corrections facility; and
(h) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best inteiwS
of the child.
(3) Once the visitation schedule has been established, the parties mayl**
alter the schedule except by mutual consent of the parties or a court order.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-34, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 131, § 4.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131

became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

506

DIVORCE

30-3-35

30-3-35. Minimum schedule for visitation.
(1) The visitation schedule shall apply to school-age children, ages 5-18,
beginning with kindergarten.
(2) If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, the following schedule
shall be considered the minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent
and the child shall be entitled:
(a) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or
the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m;
(b) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry
of the decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each
year;
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes
shall not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend
visitation schedule;
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that
school day;
(e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the
total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from
school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be
entitled to this lengthier holiday period;
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is
entitled to the following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial
parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday
until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(iii) Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Sunday at 7
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until
11 p.m. on the holiday;
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in
Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until
1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided;
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is
entitled to the following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other
siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) New Year's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday
until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(iii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday
. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
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(iv) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11
p.m. on the holiday;
(v) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m.
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the
noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(vi) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A.
weekend beginning at 6 p.m on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m.
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the
noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(vii) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday
until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(viii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until
Sunday at 7 p.m; and
(ix) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined
in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m.
until 9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally
divided;
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(j) extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be:
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial
parent;
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial
parent; and
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines;
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two week period of
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for
purposes of vacation;
(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's
extended visitation shall be Vi of the vacation time for year-round school
breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits;
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child
shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-35, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 131, § 5.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch 131

became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

30-3-36. Special circumstances.
(1) When visitation has not taken place for an extended period of time and
the child lacks an appropriate bond with the noncustodial parent, both parents
shall consider the possible adverse effects upon the child and gradually
reintroduce an appropriate visitation plan for the noncustodial parent.
(2) For emergency purposes, whenever the child travels with either parent,
all of the following will be provided to the other parent:
(a) an itinerary of travel dates;
(b) destinations;
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(c) places where the child or traveling parent can be reached; and
(d) the name and telephone number of an available third person who
would be knowledgeable of the child's location.
(3) Unchaperoned travel of a child under the age of five years is not
recommended.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-36, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 131, § 6.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131

became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25

30-3-37. Relocation.
(1) When either parent decides to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles
or more from the residence specified in the court's decree, that parent shall
provide reasonable advance written notice of the intended relocation to the
other parent.
(2) The court may, upon motion of any party or upon the court's own motion,
schedule a hearing with notice to review the visitation schedule as provided in
Section 30-3-35 and make appropriate orders regarding the visitation and
costs for visitation transportation.
(3) In determining the visitation schedule and allocating the transportation
costs, the court shall consider:
(a) the reason for the parent's relocation;
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both parents in exercising
visitation;
(c) the economic resources of both parents; and
(d) other factors the court considers necessary and relevant.
(4) Upon the motion of any party, the court may order the parent intending
to move to pay the costs of transportation for:
(a) at least one visit per year with the other parent; and
(b) any number of additional visits as determined equitable by the
court.
(5) Upon the motion of any party, the court may order uninterrupted
visitation with the noncustodial parent for a minimum of 30 days during
extended visitation, except if the court finds it is not in the best interests of the
child.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-37, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 131, § 7.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131

became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing
fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial
Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of
the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per
annum or fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge
by majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties
of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sentence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-

ficeof a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years
and until a successor is appointed and approved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the
present third and fourth sentences and made
minor stylistic changes,

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
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(b.) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h> appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
' (i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Historv: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by ch. 73, effective April 25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) and (b) in
Subsection (1); inserted "resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a);
substituted "state agencies" for "state and local
agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); deleted
"notwithstanding any other provision of law"
at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsections (2Kb)
to (2Xh) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); added
"except those from the small claims department of a circuit court" at the end of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic changes.
The 1988 amendment by ch. 210, effective
April 25, 1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i).
The 1988 amendment by ch. 248, effective
April 25, 1988, in Subsection (2)(a), rewrote
the phrase before "except" which had read "the

final orders and decrees of state and local agencies or appeals from the district court review of
them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other
provision of law" at the end of Subsection
(2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2Kb); designated former Subsections (2)(b) to (2)(h) as
Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and substituted
"first degree or capital felony" for "first or capital degree felony" in present Subsection (2)(f).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 80, effective
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (2)(g),
which read "appeals from orders on petitions
for extraordinary writs involving a criminal
conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony" and made punctuation
changes in Subsections (2)(h) and (3).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 224, effective
April 23, 1990, inserted the subdivision designation (i) in Subsection (2Kb) and added Subsection (2)(lb)(ii), and made related stylistic
changes.
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1,
1992, substituted "a court of record" for "district court" in Subsection (2Kf).
Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15,
39-6-16.
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78-25-18. Blood tests for child and alleged parents in civil
actions and bastardy proceedings in which parentage is a relevant fact.
In any civil action or in bastardy proceedings in which the parentage of a
person is a relevant fact, the court shall order the child and alleged parents to
submit to blood tests.
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 1.
Cross-References. — Uniform Act on Paternity, blood tests, §§ 78-45a-7 to 78-45a-10.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
—Standards.
Standards for admission of human leukocyte
antigen tests held not to have been satisfied.
See Martinez v. Lovato, 744 P.2d 1364 (Utah
1987); Salzetti v. Nichols, 744 P.2d 1362 (Utah
1987).

ANALYSIS

Leukocyte antigen tests.
—Admissibility.
—Standards.
Right to tests.
—Divorce action.
Cited.

Right to tests.

Leukocyte antigen tests.
—Admissibility.
The basic principles upon which human leukocyte antigen tests for determining paternity
are founded have now received general acceptance in the scientific community and are admissible if specified standards are met. Kofford
v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987).

—Divorce action.
Husband denying paternity of child born
during marriage was entitled to blood tests in
divorce action. Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106
(Utah 1986).
Cited in State ex rel. J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710
(Utah 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note,
J.W.F. v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's Rights to
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law,
1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 955.

A.L.R. — Blood grouping tests, 43 A.L.R.4th
579.

78-25-19. Blood test — Who to make.
The test may be made by no more than three qualified examiners of blood
types, not restricted to physicians, who shall be appointed by the court. The
examiner may not be informed of the identity of any party to the action in
which he is appointed.
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 2.
Cross-References. — Court appointment of
expert witnesses, Rules of Evidence, Rule 706.
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78-25-20. Examiner as witness.
The court shall call the examiner as a witness to testify to his findings, and
the examiner is subject to cross-examination by the parties, except that the
order for blood tests may direct that the testimony of the examiner and crossexamination be taken by deposition as provided by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 3.

78-25-21. Admissibility of results in evidence.
The results of the tests shall be received in evidence where the conclusion of
all examiners, as disclosed by the tests, is that the alleged father is not the
actual father of the child, and the question of paternity shall be so resolved. If
the examiners disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be
submitted to a jury duly impaneled. If the examiners conclude that the blood
tests show the possibility of the alleged father's paternity, admission of this
evidence is within the discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency
of the blood type.
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 4; 1969, ch. 257,
§ 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

—Standards.

.
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Leukocyteantigen tests.
-S^^da
Standard of proof.
Cited.
Leukocyte antigen tests.
Admissibility
The basic principles upon which human leukocyte antigen tests for determining paternity
are founded have now received general acceptance in the scientific community and are admissible if specified standards are met. Kofford
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note,
J.W.F. v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's Rights to
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1989 B Y U L Rev 955
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78-25-22. Court may resolve parentage against party r«
fusing to submit to blood tests.
The court may resolve the question of parentage against a party who r<
fuses to submit to blood tests ordered by the court despite the weight of othe
evidence.
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 5.

78-25-23. Costs of examination.
The court shall determine the reasonable compensation to be paid to a
examiner appointed by the court, and, in its discretion, may order that th
parties pay the costs in such proportions as it shall prescribe and may ord€
that the proportion of any party shall be paid by the county in which th
action is brought.
History: L. 1955, ch. 46, § 6.

78-25-24. Reserved.
78-25-25. Patients' records — Inspection and copying b]
attorneys.
Whenever an attorney-at-law duly licensed to practice in the state of Utal
is authorized to represent the interest of a patient of any physician and sur
geon, dentist, osteopathic physician, registered nurse, psychologist, chiroprac
tor, or a licensed hospital and that attorney desires to examine or to obtaii
copies of any of the patient's records in the custody or control of such person o
hospital, those records shall be made available, at the regular place of busi
ness of the person or hospital having custody or control thereof, for inspectioi
and copying by the attorney if he presents to such person or hospital a writtei
authorization signed and acknowledged by the patient before a notary public
or in the case of a minor, by a parent or guardian, or in the case of a deceasec
patient, by the personal representative or an heir. Such records shall remair
in the possession of the person or hospital having custody or control thereoi
and the attorney shall pay, as part of the costs advanced on behalf of his
client, for all copies made at his request.
History: C. 1953, 78-25-25, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 213, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain
Health Care, 740 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
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History: C. 1953, 78-30-4.6, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 245, § 10.
Effective Dates. —• Laws 1990, ch. 245 be-

came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Judicial termination of rights.
Juvenile court order placing children with
the state department of public welfare (now
Department of Social Services) for "foster home
care, treatment, and supervision" and requiring father to pay for such care was not a judicial deprivation of custody on account of cru-

elty, neglect or desertion within former
§ 78-30-4 so as to render parents' consent to
adoption unnecessary; not every judicial deprivation of custody is a permanent deprivation,
Deveraux' Adoption v. Brown, 2 Utah 2d 30,
268 P.2d 995 (1954).

78-30-4.7. When notice of petition required — Manner of
service — Waiver.
(1) Notice of pendency of an adoption proceeding shall be served on all of
the following by the petitioner at least 30 days prior to the final dispositional
hearing:
(a) any person, agency, or institution whose consent or relinquishment
is required under Section 78-30-4.1 unless those rights have been terminated by waiver, relinquishment, consent, or judicial termination;
(b) any person who has filed a notice of paternity, acknowledging paternity of the child, with the state registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health; the sole purpose of notice under this subsection is to
enable the person served to present evidence to the court relating to the
best interests of the child, and regarding whether that person's consent to
the adoption is required under Section 78-30-4.1;
(c) the legally appointed custodian or guardian of the adoptee;
(d) the spouse of any petitioner who has not joined in the petition; and
(e) the spouse of the adoptee.
(2) The notice required by this section shall specifically state that the person served must respond to the petition within 30 days of service if he or she
intends to contest the adoption.
(3) Service of notice under this section shall be made as follows:
(a) Service on a person whose consent is necessary under this chapter
shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. If service is by publication, the court shall designate the content of the notice regarding the identity of the parties. The notice may not
include the name of the person or persons seeking to adopt the adoptee.
(b) As to any other person for whom notice is required under Subsection (1), service by certified mail, return receipt requested, is sufficient. If
that service cannot be completed after two attempts, the court may issue
an order providing for service by publication, posting, or by any other
manner of service.
(c) Notice to a person who has filed his notice of paternity with the
state registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health shall be
served by certified mail, return receipt requested, at the last address filed
with the registrar.
(4) The notice required by this section may be waived in writing by the
person entitled to receive notice.
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(5) Proof of service of the notice on all persons for whom notice is required
by this section shall be filed with the court before the final dispositional
hearing on the adoption, or before any contested hearing pursuant to Section
78-30-4.10.
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the notice of an
adoption proceeding nor any process in that proceeding may be required to
contain the name of the person or persons seeking to adopt the adoptee.
History: C. 1953, 78-30-4.7, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 245, § 11.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 245 be-

came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-30-4A Filing requirements — Children born outside of
marriage.
(1) Any person who is the father or claims to be the father of a child born
outside of marriage may file notice of his claim of paternity and of his willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability with the state
registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health. The Department of
Health shall provide forms for the purpose of filing the notices of paternity
described in this section. Forms shall be made available by the department, in
the office of the county clerk in each county, in every hospital, as defined in
Subsection 26-21-2(9), and in every licensed child placing agency.
(2) The notice may be filed prior to the birth of the child but must be filed
prior to the time the child is relinquished to a licensed child placing agency or
prior to the filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed
the child for adoption. The notice shalfBe signed by the person filing and shall
include his name and address, the name and last known address of the birth
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and year
of the expected birth of the child. The person who files a notice under this
section shall notify the registrar of vital statistics of any change of his address. The Department of Health shall maintain a confidential registry for
this purpose.
(3) The Legislature finds that a certain degree of finality is necessary in
order to facilitate the state's interest in expediting the adoption of young
children and in protecting the rights and interests of the child, the birth
mother, and the adoptive parents. Therefore, any putative father who fails to
file his notice of paternity is barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining
any action to assert any interest in the child unless he proves by clear and
convincing evidence that:
(a) it was not possible for him to file a notice of paternity within the
period of time specified in Subsection (2);
(b) his failure to file a notice of paternity was through no fault of his
own; and
(c) he filed a notice of paternity within 10 days after it became possible
for him to file.
(4) Except as provided in Subsection 78-30-4.1(d), failure to file a timely
notice of paternity shall be deemed to be a waiver and surrender of any right
to notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for adoption of the child,
and the consent of that person to the adoption of the child is not required.
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(5) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to a child born outside of marriage, if there is no showing that a putative father has consented to or waived
his rights regarding the proposed adoption, it shall be necessary to file with
the court, prior to its entering a final decree of adoption, a certificate from the
Department of Health, signed by the state registrar of vital statistics, stating
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from putative
fathers of children born outside of marriage and that no filing has been found
pertaining to the father of the child in question.
History: C. 1953, 78-30-4.8, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 245, § 12.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 245 became effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Compiler's Notes. — The reference to Subsection 26-21-2(9) in Subsection (1) probably
should be to Subsection 26-21-2(10), "Health
Care Facility."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Wrongful termination of parental rights.
Constitutionality.
Former Subsection 78-30-4(3), which was
similar to this section, was held not to deny the
father of an illegitimate child equal protection
of the laws. Ellis v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 615
P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980).
Where the unmarried father of a child filed a
paternity claim after placement of the child
with adoption service, it was not a denial of his
constitutional right of due process to fail to
give actual notice of the procedural filing requirement. Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680
P.2d 753 (Utah 1984).
For case upholding termination of unwed
father's rights under former Subsection
78-30-4(3), which was similar to this section,
against claims that termination violated due
process and equal protection, and finding state
action present in placement by private agency,

see Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 761 P.2d
932 (Utah Ct. App.), aflPd, 795 P.2d 637 (Utah
1990).
For case establishing due process requirements relating to notice of paternity filing
(now found in Subsection (3) of this section),
see Ellis v. Social Servs. Dep't of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d
1250 (Utah 1980).
Wrongful termination of parental rights.
Termination of a non-resident father's parental rights to his illegitimate son violated
due process, where although a petition for
adoption was filed two days prior to the father's filing of a notice of paternity, all parties
were distinctly aware of the father's intent and
desire to rear the child, and the record indicated that the mother's family deliberately
withheld information in order to avoid potential "problems" with the father, who they knew
would obstruct the adoption. In re Baby Boy
Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note,
The Putative Father's Due Process Rights to

Notice and a Hearing: In re Baby Boy Doe,
1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1081.

78-30-4.9. Custody pending final decree.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by the court, once a petitioner has received the adoptee into his home and a petition for adoption has been filed, the
petitioner is entitled to the custody and control of the adoptee and is responsible for the care, maintenance, and support of the adoptee, including any necessary medical or surgical treatment, pending further order of the court.
(2) Once a child has been placed with, relinquished to, or ordered into the
custody of a licensed child placing agency for purposes of adoption, the agency
shall have custody and control of the child and is responsible for his care,
maintenance, and support. The agency may delegate the responsibility for
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78-45-4. Duty of woman.
Every woman shall support her child; and she shall support her husband
when he is in need.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 4.
Cross-References. — Criminal nonsupport
of children, § 76-7-201.

Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
more specific duty imposed by the court. In re
C.J.U., 660 P.2d 237 (Utah 1983).

ANALYSIS

Duty to support children.
—Judicial limitation.
—Transfer.
—Termination.
Divorce.

—Transfer.
A parent cannot rid herself of her duty to
support her children by purporting to transfer
this duty to someone else by contract. Gulley v.
Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977).

Duty to support children.
—Judicial limitation.
Parents are "duty-bound" to support their
children; however, the extent of that duty is
not without limitation, and where the question
of child support has been submitted to a court
of competent jurisdiction and a ruling thereon
has been obtained, the more general statutory
duty of support becomes circumscribed by the

—Termination.
Divorce.
The fact that the wife in a divorce proceeding
is not required to pay support, neither terminates the children's right, nor obviates the
mother's responsibility, for such support as
may be determined at some future time. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — From Guesswork to
Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child
Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev.
859.
Am. JUT. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband
and Wife § 334; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and
Child § 54.
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 48;
67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 54.

A.L.R. — Liability of parent for support of
child institutionalized by juvenile court, 59
A.L.R.3d 636.
Wife's possession of independent means as
affecting her right to child support pendente
lite, 60 A.L.R.3d 832.
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife «=» 4;
Parent and Child *=» 3.1(3).

78-45-4.1. Duty of stepparent to support stepchild — Effect of termination of marriage or common law
relationship.
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent that a natural or
adoptive parent is required to support a child. Provided, however, that upon
the termination of the marriage or common law relationship between the
stepparent and the child's natural or adoptive parent the support obligation
shall terminate.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-4.1, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 131, § 2; 1980, ch. 42, § 1.

Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30
of this title.
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5.
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6 section is set out as reconciled by the
of Legislative Research and General
3el.
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Federal Law. — Title IV-D of the federal
Social Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 651 et seq.

15-3. Duty of man.
Every father shall support his child; and every man shall support his
when she is in need.
Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or
>-7.15:
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and
lecessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeible upon the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of
he parents.
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses
lescribed in Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children.
ory: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 3; 1977, ch.
3; 1991, ch. 143, § 1; 1995, ch. 175, § 3.
indment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

ment, effective May 1,1995, added Subsection
(2).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
R. — Sexual partner's tort liability to
artner for fraudulent misrepresentation
ng sterility or use of birth control result>regnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 301.

Parent's child support Liability as affected by
other parent's fraudulent misrepresentation regarding sterility or use of birth control, or
refusal to abort pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 337.

5-4. Duty of woman.
Every woman shall support her child; and she shall support her husband
he is in need.
Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or
7.15:
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and
pessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are charge)le upon the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of
,e parents.
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses
scribed in Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children.
ry: L. 1957, ch. 110, 5 4; 1995, ch.
I.
idment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

ment, effective May 1,1995, added Subsection
(2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
in Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah
1993).
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(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrativei
not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that
current in his child support obligation, in which case the court on
tive agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent.
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless t h e ^ o ^
result in a tax benefit to that parent.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.21, enacted by L.
Effective Dates. — Laws 10949H
1994, ch. 118, § 22.
makes the act effective on J n f r l g f l

78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support.
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the ttt^jH
office may proceed pursuant to this chapter or any other applicahtoS
on behalf of:
(i) the Department of Human Services;
_
(ii) any other department or agency of this state that
public assistance, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-303 (3),the right to recover public assistance; or
(iii) the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right of support a
obligor,
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the office
payment of the obligor's support obligation, the attorney
county attorney of the county of residence of the obligee shall
office.
(2) (a) A person may not commence an action, file a pleading, or
written stipulation to the court, without complying with Sul
if the purpose or effect of the action, pleading, or stipulation is
(i) establish paternity;
(ii) establish or modify a support obligation;
(iii) change the court-ordered manner of payment of su]
(iv) recover support due or owing.
(b) (i) When taking an action described in Subsection (2XaX'
must file an affidavit with the court at the time the
commenced, the pleading is filed, or the stipulation is
stating whether child support services have been or are
vided under Part IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.,"
et seq., on behalf of a child who is a subject of the action, pi
stipulation.
(ii) If child support services have been or are being provide^
Part IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 601 « f c "
person shall mail a copy of the affidavit and a copy of the pT
stipulation to the Office of the Attorney General, Child
Division.
(iii) If notice is not given in accordance with this sul
office is not bound by any decision, judgment, agreement, or
mise rendered in the action.
(c) If IV-D services have been or are being provided, that
join the office as a party to the action, or mail or deliver a written
to the Office of the Attorney General, Child Support Division
office to join as a party to the action. A copy of that request,
proof of service, shall oe filed with the court. The office shall be
sented as provided in Subsection (l)(b).
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Neither the attorney general nor the county attorney represents or has
ttorney-client relationship with the obligee or the obligor in carrying out
iuties under this chapter.
itory: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 9; 1975, ch. 96,
1977, ch. 145, § 11; 1982, ch. 63, § 2;
ch. 62, S 23; 1990, ch. 183, § 59; 1994,
40, ! 15; 1995, ch. 258, § 15.
endmenl: Notes. — The 1994 amendeffective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsec2)(a) which read "A person may not come any action or file a pleading to establish
adify a support obligation or to recover
>rt due or owing, whether under this chapr any other applicable statute, without
an affidavit with the court at the time the
i is commenced or the pleading is filed
lg whether public assistance has been or is
: provided on behalf of a dependent child of
erson commencing the action or filing the
ling*; added the designation for Subsection
i and the second sentence in the subsecredesignated former Subsection (2Kb) as
ection (2)(c) and added the language be-

ginning "or mail or deliver" at the end of the
first sentence and inserted the second sentence
therein; deleted former Subsection (3) which
read "As used in this section 'office' means the
Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services"; and added Subsection (3).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995,
substituted "child support services have been
or are being provided under Part IV of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 601 et
seq." for "public assistance has been or is being
provided" in Subsection (2XbXi) and (2XbXii);
added "of the Attorney General, Child Support
Division" at the end of Subsection (2XbXii) and
in Subsection (2Xc); added Subsection
(2)(bXiii); substituted "IV-D services have been
or are" for "public assistance has been or is" in
Subsection (2Xc); and made numerous stylistic
changes.

CHAPTER 45a
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
ion
5a-2.
5a-5.

Determination of paternity —
Effect — Enforcement.
Remedies.

Section
78-45a-7.
78-45a-10.
78-45a-10.5.

Authority for genetic testing.
Effect of genetic test results.
Visitation rights of father.

45a-2. Determination of paternity — Effect — Enforcement.
L) Paternity may be determined upon:
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public
authority chargeable by law with the support of the child; or
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in accordance with
Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act.
2) If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to
laws of this state or any other state, the liabilities of the father may be
breed in the same or other proceedings by:
(a) the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or may
furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education,
necessary support, or funeral expenses; and
(b) other persons including private agencies to the extent that they
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses.
Cistory: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch.
», § 23; 1994, ch. 127, § 2.
intendment Notes. — The 1994 amendnt, effective May 2, 1994, designated the
it sentence as Subsection (1), adding Subsec-

tion (1Kb), and designated the second sentence
as Subsection (2), making related stylistic
changes and inserting "or any other state" in
the introductory language.
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78-45a-5. Remedies.
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action to establish paternity. All
remedies for enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for
legitimate children shall apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies
under Title 77, Chapter 31, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
are available for enforcement of duties of support under this act.
(2) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and
the Department of Human Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee
or in its own behalf, pursuant to the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11,
to enforce that right of support against the obligor.
(b) The provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, apply in all actions by the
department.
(c) Whenever the department commences an action under this chapter,
it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the county attorney of the
county where the obligee resides to represent the department. Neither the
attorney general nor the county attorney represents or has an attorneyclient relationship with the obligee or the obligor, in carrying out his
responsibilities under this chapter.
(3) The court may enter an order awarding costs, attorney fees, and witness
fees in the manner prescribed by Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or acknowledgment of paternity.
(4) The provisions of Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, apply to
paternity actions commenced under this chapter.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96, under this act" for "a court action is commenced
!aol ; l u 9 0 , Ch * 1 8 3 , § 6 0 ; 1 9 9 2 , c h u 160 » S 2 ; b ? t h e s t a t e Department of Human Services" in
1993, ch. 137, § 16; 1994, ch. 140, § 16.
that subsection; and made stylistic changes
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- throughout the section,
ment, effective July 1, 1992, in Subsection (1),
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993,
divided the former first sentence into two sen- deleted the (3) designation formerly before the
tences, substituted "action to establish pater- present last sentence in Subsection (2) and
nity* for "action under this act* at the end of the added present Subsection (3).
present first sentence, and added the title and
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994,
chapter citation to the reference in the last subdivided Subsection (2); substituted "chapsentence; in Subsection (2), substituted the ter" for "act" in the first sentence and added the
reference to Titlef62A, Chapter 11 for "Chapter second sentence in Subsection (2Xc); added
45b of this title"in the first and second sen- Subsection (4); and made stylistic changes,
tences; designated the former last sentence of
Meaning of 'this a c t " — The phrase "this
Subsection (2) as Subsection (3) and substi- act" in Subsection (1) refers to Laws 1965, ch.
tuted the department commences an action 158, which enacted §§ 78-45a-l to 78-45a-17.

78-45a-7. Authority for genetic testing,
(1) Upon motion of any party to the action, made at a time so as not to delay
the proceedings unduly, the court shall order the mother, the child, and the
alleged father to submit to genetic testing.
(2) The court may, upon its own initiative or upon request made by or on
behalf of any person whose blood is involved, order the mother, the chad, and
the alleged father to submit to genetic testing.
(3) If any party refuses to submit to those tests, the court may resolve the
question of paternity against that party, or may enforce its order if the rights
of others and the interests of justice so require.

UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
.story: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7; 1992, ch.
§ 3.
nendment Notes. — The 1992 amendb, effective July 1, 1992, added the subsecdesignations; divided the former first sen-
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tence into two sentences, reversing their order
and substituting "genetic testing" for "blood
tests* in both subsections and "request" for
"suggestion* in Subsection (2); and made stylistic changes throughout the section.

45a-10. Effect of genetic test results.
.) If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts, as disclosed by the
lence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of
child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly.
t) If the experts conclude that the genetic tests show the possibility of the
ged father's paternity, admission of that evidence is within the discretion of
court.
I) (a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if genetic
testing results in a paternity index of at least 100.
(b) A presumption under this subsection may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.
t) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), the court may receive testimony and genetic test results from genetic testing experts and others
involved in conducting the genetic tests in the form of an affidavit
(b) If any party objects to the court's receipt of the testimony or test
results in affidavit form, that party may file a written objection with the
court. The objection shall be filed within 30 days after service of the
written test results on that party. Failure to timely file an objection under
this subsection constitutes a waiver of that objection.
story: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10; 1992, ch.
§ 4.
nendment Notes. — The 1992 amendt, effective July 1, 1992, designated the
er first and third sentences as Subsections
tnd (2), respectively; deleted the former
id sentence which read: "If the experts

disagree in their findings or conclusions, the
question shall be submitted upon all the evidence"; substituted "genetic tests* for "blood
tests," deleted "depending upon the infrequency
of the blood type" from the end, and made a
stylistic change in Subsection (2); and added
Subsections (3) and (4).

45a-10.5. Visitation rights of father.
.) If the court determines that the alleged father is the father, it may upon
own motion or upon motion of the father, order visitation rights in
>rdance with Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37 as it considers appropriate
er the circumstances.
!) Visitation rights may not be granted to a father if the child has been
sequently adopted.
istory: C. 1953, 78-45a-10.5, enacted by
*94, ch. 29, § 1.
fective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 29 be-

came effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Equitable estoppel.
Since courts are reluctant to use an equitable estoppel theory to impose a support obligation on a man who is not the biological father
of a child, a stepfather was not equitably estopped from denying liability where there was

no evidence that the mother had attempted to
collect support from the natural father, even
though the stepfather had married the mother
prior to the child's birth, and at one time had
claimed the child as his own. Wiese v. Wiese,
699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — From Guesswork to
Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child
Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev.
859.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note,
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Stepparents — The Utah Supreme Court Toppled
by Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987).

A.L.R. — Stepparent's postdivorce duty to
support stepchild, 44 A.L.R.4th 520.
Parental rights of man who is not biological
or adoptive father of child but was husband or
cohabitant of mother when child was conceived
or born, 84 A.L.R.4th 655.

78-45-4.2. Natural or adoptive parent has primary obligation of support — Right of stepparent to recover
support.
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the natural parent or adoptive
parent of the primary obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has the
same right to recover support for a stepchild from the natural or adoptive
parent as any other obligee.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-4.2, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 131, § 3.
Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30
of this title.

Income withholding,
62A-11-414.

§§ 62A-11-401

to

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cause of action for support.
A minor child, via her guardian ad litem,
has standing to maintain a cause of action

against her father for support. Fauver v.
Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note,
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Step-

parents — The Utah Supreme Court Toppled
by Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987).

78-45-4.3. Ward of state — Primary obligation to support.
Notwithstanding Section 78-45-2, a natural or an adoptive parent or stepparent whose minor child has become a ward of the state is not relieved of the
primary obligation to support that child until he reaches the age of majority.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-4.3, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 120, § 1.

Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30
of this title.
Period of minority, § 15-2-1.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

CHAPTER 45e
VOLUNTARY DECLARATION OF
PATERNITY
Section
78-45e-l.
78-45e-2.

Chapter title.
Voluntary declaration of paternity.

Section
78-45e-3.
78-45e-4.

Requirements for filing.
Court rescission of the declaration.

78-45e-l. Chapter title.
This act is known as the "Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act."
History: C. 1953, 78-45e-l, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 127, t 3.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 127

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant tc
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45e-2. Voluntary declaration of paternity.
(1) (a) A voluntary declaration of paternity filed in compliance with this
chapter establishes a father-child relationship identical to the relationship
established when a child is born to persons married to each other.
(b) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed, the liabilities oi
the father include, but are not limited to, the reasonable expense of the
mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the education, necessary
support, and any fUneral expenses for the child.
(c) When a father voluntarily declares paternity, his liability for past
amounts due is limited to a period of four years immediately preceding the
date that the voluntary declaration of paternity was filed.
(2) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed it shall be recognized
as a basis for a child support order without any further requirement or
proceeding regarding the establishment of paternity.
(3) The voluntary declaration of paternity may be completed and signed any
time after the birth of the child. A voluntary declaration of paternity may not
be executed or filed after consent to or relinquishment for adoption has been
signed.
(4) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall become an amendment to
the original birth certificate. The original certificate and the declaration shall
be marked so as to be distinguishable. The declaration may be included as part
of subsequently issued certified copies of the birth certificate. Alternatively,
electronically issued copies of a certificate may reflect the amended information and the date of amendment only.
(5) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall be in the form prescribed by
the state registrar of vital statistics.
History: C. 1953, 78-45e-2, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 127, § 4; 1995, ch. 258, § 16.
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amend-

ment, effective May 1,1995, deleted "during the
pregnancy or" before "after the birth" in the
first
sentence of Subsection (3).
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Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 127
became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45e-3. Requirements for filing.
A voluntary declaration of paternity may not befiledwith the state registrar
unless the declaration:
(1) is signed by the birth mother and biological father, and by the legal
guardian or a parent of a biological father who is under 18 years of age;
and
(2) includes a jurat, as defined in Section 46-1-2, for the biological
mother and father, and an acknowledgment, as defined in Section 46-1-2
for a guardian or parent who may be required to sign the declaration.
History: C. 1953, 78-45e-3, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 127, § 5.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 127

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45e-4. Court rescission of the declaration.
(1) (a) A voluntary declaration of paternity may be rescinded by order of a
court of competent jurisdiction within 24 months after it was executed
only:
(i) upon a showing by a preponderance of evidence that the child is
not the natural issue of the declared father; and
(ii) if neither declarant has relinquished the child for adoption or
terminated parental rights,
(b) After the 24 month time period described in Subsection (a) has
expired, a voluntary declaration of paternity becomes a conclusive presumption of paternity.
(2) In determining whether to rescind the declaration the court has the
same authority and obligation with regard to genetic testing as is provided in
Section 78-45a-7.
(3) A child support order based on the voluntary declaration of paternity
remains in effect during the pendency of any proceeding under this section,
and until a final order of the court rescinding the voluntary declaration.
(4) If the declaration is rescinded, the declarant father may not recover any
child support he provided for the child before entry of the order of rescission.
History: C. 1953, 78-45e-4, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 127, § 6.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 127

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.
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Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3.

[Disqualification to hold office.]

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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ined, fundamental principles of due process
>ply under the Utah Constitution, including
e requirement of providing the defendant
ith timely notice before hearings and copies of
formation in the board's file. Labrum v. State
3ard of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993).
In original parole grant hearings at which
-edicted terms of incarceration are deterined, fundamental principles of due process
ider this section impose the requirements
iat the inmate know what information the
oard of Pardons will be considering at the
taring and that the inmate know soon enough
, advance to have a reasonable opportunity to
•epare responses and rebuttal of inaccuracies,
urtis v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 958
Jtah Ct. App. 1994).
It was not a violation of an inmate's due
rocess or double jeopardy rights for the Board
'Pardons to refuse to grant him credit for time
jrved as a condition of probation. Rawlings v.
olden, 869 P.2d 958 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
snied, 244 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah 1994).
Due process requirements of the Utah Conitution applied to a post-revocation parole
rant hearing. Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097
Jtah 1994).
An inmate is entitled to access to psychologiil reports to be considered by the Utah Board
f Pardons in hearings at which the inmate's
»lease date may be fixed or extended. Neel v.
[olden, 886 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1994).
Defendant who failed to show how the furler participation of counsel at a hearing would
ave affected the accuracy of the information
Dnsidered by the Utah Board of Pardons was
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not denied due process by the Board's refusal to
allow his counsel to address the Board. Neel v.
Holden, 886 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1994).
Sentencing.
Due process protections apply at the time of
sentencing by the trial judge, whether the
judge determines the actual number of years to
be served, as in the federal courts and some
state courts, or only whether to send the defendant to prison, as is the case in Utah. The Utah
Constitution certainly requires that equivalent
due process protection be afforded when the
Board of Pardons determines the actual number of years a defendant is to serve. Foote v.
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991).
Actions by a Board of Pardons member who
waited until the sentencing hearing had commenced to announce recusal because she was a
cousin of the murder victim, and then sat with
the victim's family at the sentencing hearing in
an apparent show of personal support, tainted
the proceeding and violated the defendant's
right to a fair hearing. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of
Pardons, 839 P.2d 874 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Workers' compensation.
The eight-year time limitation on temporary
total disability benefits in the Worker's Compensation Law is not an unconstitutional statute of repose. Stoker v. Workers' Comp. Fund,
253 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1994).
Cited in State v. Harrison, 805 R2d 769
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Adams, 830 P2d
310 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Mincy, 838
R2d 648 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — State v. Ramirez:
itrengthening Utah's Standard for Admitting
lye witness Identification Evidence, 1992 Utah
, Rev. 647.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — State
Constitutions as a Source of Individual Liberies: Expanding Protection for Abortion Fundng Under Medicaid, 19 J. Contemp. L. 185
1993).
If the Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who is
he Next Target? — An Examination of the
entrapment Theory, 19 J. Contemp. L. 217
1993).
AXJl. — Laws regulating begging, panhanlling, or similar activity by poor or homeless
>ersons, 7 A.L.R.5th 455.
Validity and construction of "extreme indifference" murder statute, 7 A.L.R.5th 758.
Propriety of telephone testimony or hearings
n prison proceedings, 9 A.L.R.5th 451.
Rights as to notice and hearing in proceeding

to revoke or suspend license to practice medicine, 10A.L.R.5th 1.
Validity, construction, and application of
state statute requiring inmate to reimburse
government for expense of incarceration, 13
A.L.R.5th 872.
Actions by state official involving defendant
as constituting "outrageous" conduct violating
due process guaranties, 18 A.L.R.5th 1.
Validity and application of statute or regulation authorizing revocation or suspension of
driver's license for reason unrelated to use of,
or ability to operate, motor vehicle, 18
A.L.R.5th 542.
Sufficiency, as to content, of notice of garnishment required to be served upon garnishee, 20
A.L.R.5th 229.
Right to compensation for real property damaged by law enforcement personnel in course of
apprehending suspect, 23 A.L.R.5th 834.
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community; trial by such a jury did not deprive
defendant of the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due process clause. State v. Alvarez,
872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994).
—Evidence.
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a
tendency to influence the outcome of the trial
by improper means, or if it appeals to the jury's
sympathies, or arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise causes
a jury to base its decision on something other
than the established propositions of the case.
State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
—False testimony.
Even though some of the testimony of two
key witnesses was erroneous, because the efforts of the prosecutor and defense attorney
successfully dispelled the confusion the inaccurate testimony may have created in the minds
of jurors, the prosecutor was not required to
stipulate that the testimony was false. State v.
Gordon, 886 R2d 112 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
—Identification of defendant.
For purposes of determining the due process
reliability of eyewitness identifications under
this section, an in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability is required, and the court
may consider fully the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the identification. State v.
Ramirez, 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (1991).
In reviewing the trial court's decision to admit evidence of an identification of the accused,
the Supreme Court will defer to the trial court's
fact-finding role by viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to the trial court's decision
to admit and by reversing its factual findings
only if they are against the clear weight of the
evidence. State v. Ramirez, 157 Utah Adv. Rep.
10 (1991).
Evidence based on observations independent
of subsequent police misconduct was admissible at trial. State v. Gurule, 856 R2d 377
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
—Interrogations.
Recording of interrogations is not required
under the Utah Constitution. State v. James,
858 R2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
—Physical restraints.
While compelling an accused to wear jail
clothing furthers no essential state policy, compelling an accused to be physically restrained
furthers the essential state policy of providing
security in the courtroom; courts have, therefore, recognized that the right to be tried without physical restraints is subject to exception.
State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering physical restraint of defendant who

8

Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
—Selective enforcement.
Plaintiffs' allegation of selective enforcement
of the child sexual abuse laws because they
were tried, convicted, and sentenced while others who were convicted of the same crime went
unpunished did not show a violation of plaintiffs' rights to equal protection of the law. At
best, plaintiffs showed laxity in enforcement of
the law, but laxity in enforcement of the law
with respect to others is not a defense to enforcement of the law against plaintiffs. Herman
v. State, 821 P.2d 457 (Utah 1991).
—Self-representation.
Denial of a capital defendant's proffered
statement at the penalty phase of the trial
violated his constitutional right of self-representation and due process. State v. Young, 853
R2d 327 (Utah 1993).
Enforcement of foreign custody judgment.
A mother was denied her due process rights
by the trial court's enforcement of a foreigncustody modification judgment of questionable
jurisdictional validity without giving the
mother reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 R2d 157 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).
Financial institution regulation.
The seizure of a failing thrift institution by
the commissioner of financial institutions pursuant to statutory requirements did not violate
substantive or procedural due process. Brown v.
Weis, 871 R2d 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Governmental Immunity Act.
The University of Utah performs a governmental function under the test developed in
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
1230 (1980), and has immunity under § 63-3010(2), immunizing government entities from
suit from injuries arising out of an assault or
battery; the immunity act was not unconstitutional as applied to a person who was injured
when assaulted and struck by an employee of
the University. Wright v. University of Utah,
876 R2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
Notice of proceedings.
Parties in a class action were entitled to
notice of proceedings by a special master to
review the reasonableness of attorney's fees
and to participate in the proceedings. Plumb v.
State, 809 R2d 734 (Utah 1990).
Parole proceedings.
The due process clause is applicable to the
procedures and regulations of the state Board
of Pardons, and its failure to develop an adequate record of its determination of a habeas
corpus petition was cause for remand. Neel v.
Holden. 849 R2d 601 (Utah Ct Ann 1Q93}
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Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
319.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 177.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 7 et
seq.
C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries § 9 et seq.
A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated or similar offense, right to trial by jury in criminal
prosecution for, 16 A.L.R.3d 1373.
Right in equity suit to jury trial of counterclaim involving legal issue, 17 A.L.R.3d 1321.
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or
to jury, 19 A.L.R.3d 1393.
Automobiles: validity and construction of
legislation authorizing revocation or suspen-
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sion of operator's license for "habitual," "persistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic regulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51
A.L.R4th 565.
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory
discharge from employment, 52 A.L.R.4th
1141.
Right to jury trial in state court divorce proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955.
Jury trial rights in, and on appeal from,
small claims court proceeding, 70 A.L.R.4th
1119.
Key Numbers. — Jury «=> 9 et seq.

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
AH courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
History: Const 1896.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Actions by court.
Actions by state.
Actions not created.
Arbitration Act.
Assignments.
Attorneys' duties.
Criminal law.
—Suspension of execution of death sentence.
Debt collection.
District court jurisdiction.
Election contest.
Forum non conveniens.
Injury or damage to property.
Intoxicating liquor.
Land Registration Act.
Limitations.
—Limitations of actions.
—Statutory limitation of review.
Occupational disease law.
Sovereign immunity.
Torts.
—Action by wife against husband.
—Loss of consortium.
Unlicensed law practice.
Waiver of rights.
Workmen's compensation law.
Cited.

Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1981 et
seq., is vested originally in the federal courts,
but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by
state courts is not thereby prohibited; in view
of the provisions of this section, therefore, it
was error for trial court to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d
625 (Utah 1977).
Trial court would not err in dismissing action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the
ground of forum non conveniens in a proper
case, but such dismissal should be without
prejudice so that the plaintiff might move his
suit to another forum without harm to his
claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah
1977).
Actions by court
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open probate proceeding and to proceed against bond of
administratrix where she has practiced extrinsic fraud on the court. Weyant v. Utah Sav. &
Trust Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.LJR.
1119 (1919).
Actions by gitate.
This section did not alter the law with respect to certain rights which are vested in the
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District court jurisdiction.
The district courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and have original jurisdiction in all
matters, civil and criminal, not excepted and
prohibited bv the Constitution. Brady v.
McGonagle, 57 Utah 424, 195 P. 188 (1921).
District courts are courts of original jurisdiction having jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law or the Constitution, but one district court cannot exercise power or control
over another. Nielson v. Schiller, 92 Utah 137,
66 P.2d 365 (1937).

state, which alone can exercise sovereign
powers; therefore, it does not prevent the state
from reserving to itself the sole right to bring
actions for the dissolution of building and loan
associations. Union Sav. & Inv. Co. v. District
Court, 44 Utah 397, 140 P. 221, 1917A Ann.
Cas. 821 (1914).
Actions not created.
This section does not create new rights, or
give new remedies where none otherwise are
given, but places a limitation upon Legislature
to prevent that branch of the state government
from closing the doors of the courts against any
person who has a legal right which is enforceable in accordance with some known remedy.
Therefore, where no right of action is given or
no remedy exists, under either the common law
or some statute, this section creates none.
Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366,
1916A L.R.A. 1140 (1915).

Election contest.
There is no intimation herein that courts are
given power to pass on purely political questions, but it is clearly stated that courts are
always open for the enforcement of such rights
and redress of such wrongs as from time immemorial have been considered as proper for
courts to consider. The power to consider political questions and the vindication of rights
growing out of or incidental to such questions
is not an inherent power of the courts. Courts
can exercise powers respecting political matters only to the extent and in the manner provided by legislature, and election contest is not
within jurisdiction of court of equity in absence
of statute. Ewing v. Harries, 68 Utah 452, 250
P. 1049 (1926).

Arbitration Act.
The amendment of the arbitration statute to
permit valid and enforceable agreements for
arbitration of future disputes does not violate
this section. Lindon City v. Engineers Constr.
Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981V
Assignments.
In action for dairy products sold, plaintiff
who was assignee of claim could bring action
thereon even if claim was assigned for purpose
of having action brought thereon. Perkes v.
Utah Idaho Milk Co., 85 Utah 217, 39 P.2d 308
(1934).
Attorneys' duties.
This section means that courts are open for
the purpose of having any order or judgment
assailed in the proper manner and at the
proper time, so that attorney with reasonable
cause may act in good faith and challenge an
order he believes to be in excess of the court's
jurisdiction. In re Thomas, 56 Utah 315,190 P.
952 (1920).
Criminal law.
—Suspension of execution of death sentence.
Former section providing that no judge, tribunal, or officer other than those mentioned
therein could suspend execution of judgment of
death except sheriff as provided in succeeding
sections with reference to inquiry as to insanity of defendant did not violate this section.
State ex rel. Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah
376, 49 P.2d 408 (1935).

Forum non conveniens.
Utah state courts may apply doctrine of
forum non conveniens to actions arising under
Federal Employers' Liability Act. Mooney v.
Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d
628 (1950).
While courts have inherent power to refuse
to exercise their jurisdiction when convinced
that to do so would work hardship on some or
all the litigants, the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be invoked only where it appears that plaintiff has selected an inconvenient forum for the purpose of annoying and
harassing defendant, or where factors such as
the location of the principal parties, ease of access to proof, availability of witnesses, etc., so
strongly preponderate in favor of holding the
trial somewhere else that to deny a motion to
dismiss would work great hardship on defendant. Summa Corp. v. Lancer Indus. Inc., 559
P.2d 544 (Utah 1977).

Debt collection.
To collect past-due claim in court is right
guaranteed by Constitution. Karenius v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 65 Utah 183, 235 P.
880 (1925).

Injury or damage to property.
A right of action exists for any injury or
damage to private property, and neither the
legislature nor municipalities can interfere
with that right. Lewis v. Pingree Nat'l Bank,
47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558, 1916C L.R.A. 1260
(1915).
Intoxicating liquor.
The liquor nuisance sections of the former
Liquor Control Act did not contravene this sec-

84

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
i. Riggins v. District Court, 89 Utah 183. 51
i 645 (1935).
epriving a holder of a state liquor store
>e of his liquor store without notice, hear, or any judicial review offends against both
guarantee of due process and the guarantee
ccess to the courts. Celebrity Club, Inc. v.
ih Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293
ah 1982).
id Registration Act.
he Torrens Act was not unconstitutional as
ferring judicial powers on registrar of titles.
iton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah 587,
P. 375, 11 A.L.R. 752 (1920).
litations.
brmer Section 78-15-3, a limitations proviI in the Utah Product Liability Act which
red actions without regard to when an inY occurred and was not designed to provide
Basonable time within which to file a lawt, was unconstitutional because it violated
5 section and the constitutional prohibition
inst abrogation of wrongful death actions,
ry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717
d 670 (Utah 1986).
'he former architects and builders statute of
ose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconstitutional unthis section because it did not provide an
ired person with an effective and reasone alternative remedy for vindication of his
her constitutional interest, and abrogation
he remedy was arbitrary and unreasonable,
i Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm
ghes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989).
lie former Utah architects and builders
tute of repose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconstiional under this section because it denied a
nedy for injury to one's person or property
ised by a latent defect. Horton v.
Idminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah
39).
Subsection 78-12-25(3), which provides a
ir-year statute of limitations on "an action
relief not otherwise provided by law," does
; violate this section. McHenry v. Utah
lley Hosp., 724 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1989).
-imitation of actions.
rhis section does not preclude the legislature
m prescribing a statute of limitations for
le within which to assail the regularity or
janization of an irrigation district. Horn v.
affer, 47 Utah 55, 151 P. 555 (1915).
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Occupational disease law.
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in excluding compensation for partial disability
from silicosis, and in rendering remedy under
that act exclusive so as to abrogate commonlaw right of action therefor, was not unconstitutional as depriving employee of his remedy
by due course of law for injury done to his person. Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. &
Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138, 93
L. Ed. 411 (1948).
Sovereign immunity.
Sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional
under this section. Madsen v. Borthick, 658
P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
Torts.
—Action by wife against husband.
Doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does
not bar wife's action against husband for the
intentional infliction of personal injuries.
Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980).
—Loss of consortium.
The Married Women's Act of 1898 (§ 30-2-4)
was a reasonable legislative enactment intended and reasonably tailored to place men
and women on equal footing with respect to
their ability to bring actions for their own injuries and to extinguish the concept that a wife
was the property of her husband. If, in the process, the husband's right to sue for loss of his
wife's consortium, which may have never existed in Utah, was abolished, that abolition
was not an unreasonable step. Cruz v. Wright,
765 P.2d 869 (Utah 1988).
Unlicensed law practice.
This section does not render unconstitutional
statute making practice of law without a license a crime. Legislature has the power to
declare acts of unauthorized practice of law to
be illegal, and to punish violations thereof by
fine and imprisonment. But the right to appear
in person and prosecute or defend a cause to
which one is a party cannot be abrogated either by the Legislature or the courts. Nelson v.
Smith, 107 Utah 382,154 P.2d 634,157 A.L.R.
512 (1944).
Waiver of rights.
Right to apply to courts for redress of wrong
is substantial right, and will not be waived by
contract except through unequivocal language.
Bracken v. Dahle, 68 Utah 486, 251 P. 16
(1926).

Statutory limitation of review.
Former act authorizing improvement discts for water or sewage systems did not vio& this section on the ground that it limited
prohibited review by the courts. Tygesen v.
agna Water Co., 119 Utah 274, 226 P.2d 127
*50).

Workmen's compensation law.
Employers are entitled to have recourse to
courts under Workmen's Compensation Act
concerning question of their ultimate liability.
Industrial Comm'n v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174
P. 825 (1918).
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mination of urban blight. Tribe v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975).

project did not unconstitutionally grant benefits to private individuals; any benefits were
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
§ 9 to 23.

C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26.
Key Numbers. — Franchises «=» 11.

• 36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec.
26.

History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-
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ANALYSIS

In general.
Age of majority.
Agent for service of process.
Automobile license law.
Construction with Art. VI, § 26.
Contract carrier permit.
Cosmetologists' license law.
Criminal actions.
—Investigations.
—Prosecution.
—Sentence.
Criminal sentence.
Disparate tax assessments.
Excess revenue refunds.
Guest statutes.
Inheritance Tax Law.
Insurance premium tax exemption.
Intoxicating liquor.
Licenses.
Massage parlor ordinance.
Municipal employment prerequisites.
Notice requirements.
Property.
—Responsibility for water service.
Public employees' retirement system.
Public officers' bonds.
Public officers' salaries.
Road poll tax.
School activities.
Search warrants.
Sunday closing laws.
Tax sales.
Unfair Practices Act.
In general.
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever
uniform laws can be enacted. State v.
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R.
696 (1921).
Objects and purposes of law present touchstone for determining proper and improper

classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78
P.2d 920,117 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. &
R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766
(1941).
One who assails legislative classification as
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such.
State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so
long as there is some basis for differentiation
between classes or subject matters included, as
compared to those excluded, provided differentiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of
act. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Before legislative enactment can be interfered with, court must be able to say that there
is no fair reason for the law that would not
require equally its extension to those which it
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Only where some persons or transactions excluded from operation of law are, as to the subject matter of the law, in no differentiable class
from those included in its operation, is the law
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis
to differentiate can be found, law must be held
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Inability of legislature to make perfect classification does not render statute unconstitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100
Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
In determining whether classification made
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimination is very essence of classification and is not
objectionable unless founded upon unreasonable distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City,
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948).
An act is never unconstitutional because of
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Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248.
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
319.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — Torts, 1987 Utah L. Rev.
292.
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 47.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-

cial Decisions — Municipal Law, 1989 Utah L.
Rev. 301.
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129.
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A.L.R. — Nonconsensual treatment of involuntarily committed mentally ill persons with
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of state constitutional guaranty, 74 A.L.R.4th
1099.
Key Numbers. — Statutes «=» 71.

Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others
retained by the people.
History: Const 1896.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Parental rights to children.
The right of a parent not to be deprived of
parental rights without a showing of unfitness,
abandonment, or substantial neglect is so fundamental and basic that it ranks among those
rights referred to in this section. In re J.P., 648
P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).
To deprive a putative father and his child of
the possible benefits of their relationship simply because the father filed a notice of his
claim of paternity just a few hours after the

mother and her grandfather had filed a petition for adoption would fly in the fact of fundamental fairness and due process. In re K.B.E.,
740 P.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1987).
Parental rights cannot be terminated by
merely applying the "best interests of the
child" standard, but, rather, there must be a
showing of the parent's unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect. T.R.F. v. Felan,
760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Comment, The Utah
Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319.

C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 471.
Key Numbers.
Constitutional Laws *=
82.

Sec. 26, [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory,]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless
by express words they are declared to be otherwise.
History: Const. 1896.
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Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim,
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially the same as Rule 8, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Amended and supplemental pleadings, U.R.C.P. 15.
Arbitration, § 78-3 la-1 et seq.
Comparative negligence, § 78-27-38.
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13.
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1
et seq.
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12.

Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim,
§§21-1-5, 78-6-14.
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2.
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10.
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and
brevity of statement, U.R.C.P. 84.
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22.
Hearing of certain defenses before trial,
U.R.C.P. 12(d).
Interpleader, U.R.C.P. 22.
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Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23, 24.
Numbered paragraphs, U.R.C.P. 10(b).
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2.
Reply to answer, order for, U.R.C.P. 7(a).
Security interest, enforceability of, § 70A203.
Special forms of pleadings and writs abolhed, U.R.C.P. 65B(a).
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq.
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Statute of frauds, investment securities,
§ 70A-8-319.
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201.
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial
Code, personal property not otherwise covered,
§ 70A-1-206.
Third-party practice, U.R.C.P. 14.
Time for answer, U.R.C.P. 12(a).
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103.
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formative defenses.
-Accord and satisfaction.
—Pleading.
—Time limitation.
-Avoidance.
-Consent.
-Election of remedies.
-Estoppel.
—Failure to plead.
-Failure of consideration.
—Failure to plead.
—Pleading.
-Failure to plead.
—Affidavit opposing summary judgment.
Denial.
—Notice and opportunity.
Waiver of defense.
-Fraud.
Necessary allegations.
-Limitation of Landowner Liability Act.
-Mitigation of damages.
Failure to plead.
Pleading.
•—Mutual mistake.
—Statute of frauds.
Motion to dismiss.
Pleading.
—Statute of limitations.
Applicability to plaintiffs.
Pleading.
Waiver.
—Waiver.
Claims for relief.
—Amendment of pleading.
—Attorney fees.
—Essential allegations.
Alienation of affections.
—Request for alternative relief.
—Sufficiency of complaint.
Attachment of exhibit.
Found not sufficient.
Found sufficient.
Liberal construction.
Consistency.
—Double recovery.
—Election between claims.
—Election of remedies under contract.
—Res judicata.
—Separate claims.
Contract and quantum meruit.
Defenses.
—Lack of consideration.
Effect of failure to deny.
Purpose of rules.
Cited.

Affirmative defenses.
—Accord and satisfaction.
Pleading.
Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded in the answer in
order to be raised; in action to recover wages
and commissions allegedly due to plaintiff,
where defendant did not raise the defense in
his answer, he could not subsequently rely on
it. Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P.2d
202 (1968).
Assertion of accord and satisfaction is generally raised by way of affirmative defense to an
action on the original agreement, and when so
raised, it must be properly pleaded. Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369
(Utah 1980).
Time limitation.
In action to rescind loan secured by mortgage, where defendant mortgagee failed to answer amended complaint within ten days after
service thereof under Rule 15, but filed motion
for permission to set forth accord and satisfaction one week before trial, refusal was not
abuse of court's discretion. Wasescha v. Terra,
Inc., 528 P.2d 802 (Utah 1974).
—Avoidance.
Subdivision (c) recognizes that affirmative
defenses include other matters "constituting
an avoidance." A new matter becomes an
"avoidance" when it suggests that a plaintiffs
complaint is invalid for other reasons not embraced by the pleadings. Creekview Apts. ex
rel. Hedman Invs., Inc. v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
771 P.2d 693 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
—Consent.
If a defending party contends he had the consent of the complaining party to do the acts
complained of, he must assert that defense as
Subdivision (c) provides. Lignell v. Berg, 593
P.2d 800 (Utah 1979).
—Election of remedies.
The defense of election of remedies is an affirmative one that must be raised by way of
answer, motion, or demand and may not be
raised for the first time on appeal. Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d
793 (Utah 1979).
—Estoppel.
Failure to plead.
Although estoppel was an affirmative defense which was not raised in the pleadings,
where the evidence offered at trial supported
the principle, the trial court's grant of motion
to amend the pleadings to conform to evidence
of estoppel would not be overturned absent a
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showing of abuse of discretion. Big Butte
Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977).
Failure to plead an estoppel waives the defense under Rule 12(h). Manger v. Davis, 619
P.2d 687 (Utah 1980).
—Failure of consideration.
Failure to plead.
Failure to pay consideration on a negotiable
instrument is an affirmative defense which
must be pleaded under Subdivision (c); and unless it is pleaded, it ordinarily will be considered waived as a defense pursuant to Rule
12(h), unless there is a motion to amend, or the
parties acquiesce in the trial of that issue, or
the plaintiff is otherwise given notice and an
opportunity to meet the issue. Olpin v. Grove
Fin. Co., 521 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1974).
Pleading.
Lack of consideration means contract never
existed; failure of consideration means contract
existed but promised performance failed; lack
of consideration negates element of plaintiff's
case and must be pleaded under Subdivision
(b), but failure of consideration raises issue
outside plaintiffs prima facie case and must be
pleaded under Subdivision (c). General Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d
502 (Utah 1976).
—Failure to plead.
Affidavit opposing summary judgment
Defenses that have not been raised by the
answer or by proper motion may not be raised
in an affidavit in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment. Valley Bank & Trust Co.
v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983).
Denial.
Any matter that does not tend to controvert
an opposing party's prima facie case must be
pleaded specifically and is not put in issue by a
denial made pursuant to Subdivision (b). General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty
Corp., 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976); Pratt v.
Board of Educ, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977).
Notice and opportunity.
The purpose of Subdivision (c) is to provide
the parties with notice of the issues raised and
an opportunity to meet them, and, where a
party has notice and opportunity, failure of the
other to plead pursuant to this rule will not bar
receipt of evidence on a defense. Cheney v.
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963).
If the interests of justice so require and the
opposing party is given a fair opportunity to
meet the defense, the trial court may permit an
affirmative defense that was not pleaded in the
answer as required by Subdivision (c) to be
tried. F.M.A. Fin. Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah
2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965).
Waiver of defense.
Because an affirmative defense raises matters outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie
case, matters constituting such defenses must
be pleaded, and are not put in issue by a denial
pursuant to Subdivision (b) of this rule; failure
to so plead constitutes waiver of the defense
pursuant to Rule 12(h). Pratt v. Board of Educ,
564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977).
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—Fraud.
Necessary allegations.
Defendants were not foreclosed from asserting defenses based on fraud by their failure to
use the term "fraud" or a derivative thereof or
by their failure to allege every element of common-law fraud, when the substance of the acts
constituting the alleged fraud had been
pleaded. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663
(Utah 1985).
—Limitation of Landowner Liability Act
The Limitation of Landowner Liability Act
(§ 57-14-1 et seq.) constitutes an "affirmative
defense" or an "avoidance" in a wrongful death
action alleging negligence, and to preserve the
act as a defense, it must be raised in the defendant's answer. Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990).
—Mitigation of damages.
Failure to plead.
Failure to plead mitigation of damages did
not result in an automatic waiver of the defense where both the pleadings and the parties'
opening statements at trial showed that the
plaintiff was clearly aware that the issue of
damages was the central one; the defendant
was not precluded from introducing evidence of
the plaintiffs failure to mitigate. Price-Orem
Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713
P.2d 55 (Utah 1986).
Pleading.
An employer who wishes to obtain the advantage of the rule that a wrongfully discharged employee is under an obligation to
minimize damages, by seeking other employment, must raise the matter as an affirmative
defense in his pleadings. Pratt v. Board of
Educ, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977).
—Mutual mistake.
Mutual mistake is an affirmative defense as
it raises matters outside the plaintiff's prima
facie case, and the failure to assert it is a
waiver of that defense. Mabey v. Kay Peterson
Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984).
—Statute of frauds.
Motion to dismiss.
The defense of the statute of frauds is an
affirmative defense which must be pleaded
pursuant to Subdivision (c) and may not be
raised by a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b). W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24
Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970).
Pleading.
The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense which must be set forth in the pleadings,
else it is waived. Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp.,
666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983).
—Statute of limitations.
——Applicability to plaintiffs.
Rule that statutes of limitation generally
must be pleaded or are waived usually applies
to defendants only; this rule cannot hold plaintiff to same accountability; where, in quiet title
action, defendant attacks validity of tax sale,
only pleading available to plaintiff to assert
statute of limitations is in reply, unauthorized
under Rule 7(a) as matter of right, except in
attacking counterclaim, and otherwise avail-
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able only by order of court. Hansen v. Morris, 3
Utah 310, 283 P.2d 884 (1955); Thomas v.
Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507
(1956).
In action to quiet title, plaintiff holders of
tax deed were not required to plead statute of
limitations (§§ 78-12-5.2, 78-12-5.3) and defendants were not required to anticipate defense
of statute of limitations where statute was first
pleaded in plaintiff's reply to defendant's answer asserting title. Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs,
6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956).
In action by water user challenging charges
of water district, plaintiff waived thirty-day
limitations statute (§ 17A-2-315) by failing to
plead it in answer to defendant's counterclaim.
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397,
375 P.2d 456 (1962).
Pleading.
The statute of limitations defense must be
pleaded as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading, or it is waived, unless an
amended pleading asserting the defense is allowed pursuant to the requirements of Rule
15(a). Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983).
Waiver.
Statutes of limitation are not jurisdictional
and can be waived. American Coal Co. v.
Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984).
—Waiver.
Pleading of waiver not required in contract
action against bank. See Titanium Metals
Corp. of Am. v. Space Metals, Inc., 529 P.2d
431 (Utah 1974).
In action to rescind contract to purchase
business on ground of fraud, defendant's claim
that any fraud had been waived by plaintiffs
continued operation of business was affirmative defense which should have been pleaded,
and failure to do so constituted waiver of defense by virtue of Rule 12(h). Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah
1976).
Claims for relief.
—Amendment of pleading.
Where pleading did not fulfill requirement of
this rule but evidence supported the court's
finding that defendant did owe amount demanded, failure of court to amend pleadings
fully to this effect was nonprejudicial in view of
Rule 15(b). Seamons v. Andersen, 122 Utah
497, 252 P.2d 209 (1952).
—Attorney fees.
Absence of demand for attorney's fees in
complaint does not preclude award of such fees
by trial court. Palombi v. D & C Bldrs., 22
Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969).
—Essential allegations.
Alienation of affections.
A complaint contains the essential allegations of a cause of action for alienation of affections when it alleges: (1) the fact of marriage,
(2) that the defendant wilfully and intentionally alienated the wife's affections, resulting in
the loss of the comfort, society and consortium
of the wife, and (3) (to justify punitive damages) a charge of malice. Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1
Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759 (1954).
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—Request for alternative relief.
An action for damages on a contract and a
suit in quasi contract under the theory of quantum meruit may be pleaded in alternative
form. Parrish v. Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318
P.2d 642 (1957).
—Sufficiency of complaint.
Complaint need only give fair notice of nature and basis or grounds of claim and indication of type of litigation; it is sufficient unless
plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in support of claim. Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah
2d 157, 280 P.2d 453 (1955).
Attachment of exhibit
While an exhibit may be considered as a part
of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose
of supplying necessary material averments nor
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983).
Found not sufficient.
Complaint did not state claim for relief from
discrimination or arbitrary action where it alleged that plaintiff's land, zoned residential,
was unsuitable for residential purposes, city
refused to rezone, and zoning ordinance was
oppressive, confiscatory and unlawful; relief
required that health, safety, morals or general
welfare of district and community would be
promoted by permitting commercial or industrial establishments in residential area. Dowse
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255
P.2d 723 (1953).
Use of terms "fraud," "conspiracy" and "negligence" in complaint constituted general accusations in the nature of conclusions of the
pleader which, without the setting out of basic
facts sufficient to constitute the charged actions, would not stand up against a motion to
dismiss. Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266,
372 P.2d 990 (1962).
Complaint claiming that there was a breach
of the provisions of a title insurance policy, but
which did not set out the particular provision
or provisions claimed to have been breached,
did not meet the requirements of Subdivision
(a) and was properly dismissed. Ellis v. Hale,
13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962).
Complaint was insufficient where it contained merely broad and general statements
that false affidavit and false pleadings were
filed and judges contacted, and that these actions prevented plaintiff from obtaining default judgment; proper complaint would have
contained such allegations as contents, nature
or substance of false statements and of conversations between attorneys and judges.
Heathman v. Fabian, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d
189 (1962).
Complaint which simply averred that "defendant made, declared and published to certain persons certain derogatory and libelous
statements relating and pertaining to the
plaintiff which tended to degrade and discredit
him" was properly dismissed as not stating a
cause of action for slander. Dennett v. Smith,
21 Utah 2d 368, 445 P.2d 983 (1968).
Motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)

